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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the effects of political 
sophistication on the use of partisan cues in the 2002 South Korean presidential 
election. Many scholars in recent years have argued that it does not matter so much 
that many voters are poorly informed about politics because they can use information 
shortcuts or heuristic cues to overcome the lack of information and still make a 
reasoned choice. Based on these studies, much of the political sophistication literature 
in political science assumes that the use of party cues in the voting booth is the 
hallmark of an unsophisticated voter. Although this idea is nice in theory, it is not 
supported by empirical evidence. Thus, I examine the relationship between political 
sophistication and the use of partisan cues in Korea. Simultaneously, this study tests 
whether the levels of political sophistication differ in regard to voter turnout and 
candidate choice.  
The results show that sophistication is positively related to identification with 
a political party. In other words, South Korean voters with high levels of 
sophistication are more likely to identify with a party than unsophisticated voters. 
Specifically, an individual’s political sophistication and ideology strongly affect the 
probability of identifying with a political party. My results also show that 
sophistication does, in fact, affect how people participate and vote in elections. The 
most important finding here is that there is a positive relationship between the level of 
political sophistication and use of partisan cues. That is, sophisticated Korean voters 
are more likely to rely on partisan cues. In the 2002 Korean presidential election, 
party identification as a heuristic did work for sophisticated voters, but not for 
unsophisticated ones.  
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Question 
Scholars have long recognized the “paradox of modern democracy,” which is a 
conflict between a normative system that rests on the assumption of informed citizens 
and the empirical evidence suggesting the contrary (Berelson 1952; Dahl 1994; Lupia 
and McCubbins 1998; Mouffe 2000; Schumpeter 1976). Many scholars have 
addressed this tension between theory and practice by redefining democracy and 
redefining what citizens should know. Since the behavioral revolution and the 
introduction of survey research, however, scholars have confirmed over and over that 
the public comes up lacking in political knowledge and information. 
Traditionally, the scholarly view of the public has not been flattering (Althaus 
1998; Bargh 1999; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; 
Converse 1964; 1970; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Downs 1957; Kinder 1998; 
Lippmann 1922; Luskin 1987; Price 1999; Schattschneider 1960). Many citizens 
know little about even the most basic rules governing politics and even less about the 
beliefs and policy positions of leaders and current events. Early on, Lippmann (1922) 
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saw a public that was largely uninformed. He argued that ordinary citizens are ill-
prepared to participate in political affairs: 
 
Without an ingrained habit of analyzing opinion when we read, talk, and 
decide, most of us would hardly suspect the need of better ideas, nor be 
interested in them when they appear, nor be able to prevent the new technical 
of political intelligence from being manipulated (Lippmann 1922, 162).  
 
He also argued that due to the sheer flow and increasing complexity of information, 
the public could neither absorb nor truly understand what was happening around them. 
Thus for Lippmann, rule by the people had become effectively obsolete.  
The first mass surveys of voters in the 1940s and 1950s confirmed Lipmann’s 
arguments. It appeared that the public was badly informed about issues, policy, and 
candidates. For example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) argued that voters 
fall short of classic standards of democratic citizenship. Campbell et al. (1960) arrived 
at similar conclusions, and Converse (1975, 79) concluded that “the most familiar fact 
to arise from sample surveys … is that popular levels of information about public 
affairs are, from the point of view of the informed observer, astonishingly low.” The 
following statement is representative of a common point of view:  
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Overall, close to a third of Americans can be categorized as “know-nothings” 
who are almost completely ignorant of relevant political information (Bennett 
1988) -- which is not, by any means, to suggest that the other two-thirds are 
well informed. … Three aspects of voter ignorance deserve particular attention. 
First, voters are not just ignorant about specific policy issues, but about the 
basic structure of government and how it operates (Bennett 1988; Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1991; 1996; Neuman 1986, ch. 2). Majorities are ignorant of such 
basic aspects of the U.S. political system as who has the power to declare war, 
the respective functions of the three branches of government, and who controls 
monetary policy (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 701-71). This suggests that 
voters not only cannot choose between specific competing policy programs, but 
also cannot accurately assign credit and blame for visible policy outcomes to 
the right office-holders (Somin 1999, 417).  
 
Low levels of knowledge have caused widespread concern for many years. For 
example, some political theorists argue that basic knowledge about the functioning of 
the government is a value on its own, and that its absence is a failure of democracy 
(Barber 1984; Dahl 1979; 1998; Pateman 1970; Putnam 2000).  
This approach to participatory democracy sets standards for democratic 
systems that no democracy can meet. A more instrumental view assumes that it will 
be difficult to translate citizens’ interests into political action or into political 
preferences for those people who lack knowledge about basic political facts. In this 
view, the more citizens know, the more they will be able to express themselves and 
act in their own interest (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Democracy with many 
badly-informed citizens is dysfunctional because the interests of many citizens are not 
 
 
 
4
reflected or are underrepresented in the decision making process.  
Generally, political sophistication1 is low in most countries. Political scholars 
have long debated political sophistication and whether poorly informed citizens are 
capable of sound political judgment and choice. The crucial issue is how ordinary 
citizens are able to make a reasonable choice in elections with low levels of political 
sophistication.  
In recent years this discussion has been dominated by the notion of cognitive 
heuristics. Although voters generally have little political information, they 
compensate for this deficit by using information shortcuts, namely heuristics or cues 
to make a reliable voting choice (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Carmines and Kuklinski 
1990; Downs 1957; Graber 2001; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Mondak 
1993a; b; Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Popkin 1991; 1994; Rahn 1993; 
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a; Zaller 1992). Reflecting this idea is the 
                                            
1 Political sophistication has been conceptualized and measured in many different ways, which are 
often used nearly interchangeably. Political sophistication, education, and awareness are often used as 
proxies for each other (Gomez and Wilson 2001; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a; Zaller 1992). 
Thus, I use “sophistication,” “knowledge,” “information,” “awareness,” “competence,” “literacy,” and 
related terms synonymously, ignoring fine distinctions among them. Conceptually, knowledge and 
sophistication may be quite different things, with the latter also capturing factors like attitude stability, 
attitude constraint, or ideological reasoning. Nevertheless, basic political knowledge is at least a 
component or prerequisite of broader political sophistication. Moreover, measures of political 
knowledge and sophistication are highly intercorrelated in practice. In fact, some analysts have argued 
that factual knowledge scales are perhaps the most reliable and valid indicators of underlying political 
sophistication (Luskin 1987); this argument parallels more recent trends toward using factual 
knowledge scales as proxies for more difficult-to-measure items like media exposure (Price and Zaller 
1993). Briefly, they all denote the sheer mass and interconnectedness of a person’s political cognitions 
(Luskin 1987; 2002). For my purposes, I focus the analysis on what people know about politics, but I 
use the more elegant term of “political sophistication.” The definition of political sophistication will be 
explained in detail in Chapter II. 
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implicit assumption that a relationship exists between sophistication and the use of 
heuristics (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991b). If heuristics address an information 
shortcut, it is logical to assume that less sophisticated citizens are more likely to use 
heuristics than are more sophisticated citizens.  
In particular, average citizens can use partisan cues to compensate for their 
limited knowledge base. It is commonly held that partisan cues serve useful heuristic 
functions. Since parties lower the costs of voting by providing citizens with fairly 
reliable cues, party identification may be thought of as “a relatively cheap cognitive 
cue” (Martinez 1990, 824). For this reason, one assumption held in common by most 
of the researchers in the field is that reliance on party cues in the voting booth is the 
mark of a distinctly unsophisticated voter (Campbell et al. 1960; Carmines and 
Stimson 1980; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Kahn and Kenney 
1997; Lau and Redlawsk 1997; 2001a; Luskin 1987; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986; 
Popkin 1991; Rahn 1993; Schaffner and Streb 2002; Shively 1979; Squire and Smith 
1988).  
Despite the richness of these studies, there are several limitations in the extant 
literature. First, the idea that political sophisticates do not use partisan cues in their 
decision-making processes is unproven. Since the use of partisan cues might require 
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even more political sophistication than having knowledge specific to party or 
candidate, it could be that there is a positive linear relation between the amount of 
sophistication people have and the shortcuts they use. In fact, it is likely that people 
with a lot of substantive knowledge make use of partisan cues and shortcuts as well to 
validate their information and come to a better conclusion (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; 
Bartels 1993; Campbell et al. 1960; Colton 2000; Converse 1964; Luskin 2002; 
Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002). Thus, empirically, we do not know the relationship 
between political sophistication and the use of partisan cues. In sum, this is still a 
mystery and deserves further study.  
Second, since most studies focus predominantly on the two main parties in the 
United States, we do not know whether or to what extent other party labels are used as 
heuristic devices in other countries. In other democratic systems, where the party 
system is in flux and/or where attachments to parties are weaker, party labels may not 
be as influential in the formation and expression of policy preferences. For such 
reasons, we should not simply assume that party labels always influence opinion 
formation and expression.  
Thus, the main research question in this dissertation is what is the relationship 
between political sophistication and the use of partisan cues in South Korean 
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politics? In other words, I will try to discover which citizens are more or less likely to 
rely on party cues in elections. This study explores the impact of political 
sophistication on the use of partisan cues, political participation, and electoral choices 
during the 2002 South Korean presidential election. To assess the effects of political 
sophistication on partisan-based presidential candidate choice, I use the Korean Social 
Science Data Center (KSDC) data sets for the 2002 Korea presidential election. 
 
1.2 Background on Electoral Studies in South Korea 
South Koreans have enjoyed free and open elections for more than a decade. 
Since the 1987 Democratic Movement2, South Korea (Korea hereafter) has made 
great progress in achieving procedural democracy (Steinberg 1998). Democratization 
began with major procedural reforms at the national level, such as the direct election 
of the president and other electoral reforms. Elections have been regularly held and 
there has been hardly any dispute over their procedures and outcomes. For Korea, 
which had had six constitutions in only five decades and where no president had left 
                                            
2 Korea began its transition from authoritarianism to democracy on June 29, 1987, when Rho Tae-woo, 
the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), announced an eight-point 
pledge. This declaration served as the first threshold of Korea’s democratic transition from a military 
dictatorship. Shortly thereafter, the June 29th declaration was adopted in the National Assembly as a 
blueprint for amending the Fifth Republic’s authoritarian constitution. Rho was elected on December 
16, 1987, in the first popular election held in twenty-six years. The Sixth Republican under Rho was 
relatively democratic. He loosed the coercive state and the activated of civil society. For detail of the 
historical profile, see Kil and Moon (2001), and Saxer (2002). 
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office peacefully before 1987, the last 30 years have marked a period of 
unprecedented democratic continuity and political stability.  
Because of this, Korea has become “the most powerful democracy in East 
Asia after Japan” (Diamond and Sin 2000, 1). Indeed, “Korea became the first third-
wave democracy in East Asia to peacefully transfer to an opposing party” on 
December 16, 1997 (Diamond and Sin 2000, 2). Specifically the victory of the 
opposition over the party in power and, above all, the turnover of the presidency in 
1997 seem to indicate that Korean democracy is on the road to full consolidation (Chu, 
Diamond, and Shin 2001; Diamond and Sin 2000, 3). 
In order for a democracy to operate effectively, however, its citizens must 
possess a rudimentary understanding of politics. Understanding how government 
operates, who composes government, and the details of salient political issues is a 
prerequisite to meaningful political participation (Berinsky 2002; Gilens 2005; 
Hacker 2004; Martin 2003). The consolidation of a new democracy like Korea 
requires the mass citizenry to become sophisticated in democratic politics on an 
increasing basis. As Korea entered the consolidation democracy period, the concept of 
political sophistication gained a dynamic momentum. It refers to the possession of a 
capacity for political participation. In addition, research on party identification in new 
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democracies shows that partisanship enhances prospects of democratic consolidation 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Converse 1969; Converse and Dupeux 1962; Mainwaring 
1999). 
Actually, elections in Korea are dominated by political parties, although there 
is a major difference between the role of political parties in Korean elections and that 
in American elections. Because of a centralized power structure and regional party 
systems, Korean politics is party-centered politics (Cho 1998; Lee and Brunn 1996).3 
The formation of the party around politically famous figures, party-dominated 
nominations, and the heavy reliance upon parties for campaign funds leads to the 
concentration of power in a few party leaders.  
Major political parties in the history of Korean politics were constructed by 
politically famous figures (Lee and Brunn 1996). Political leaders have built their 
parties by relying heavily on their home province, and have personalized their parties. 
In addition, because political leaders merged and split their parties so often and 
changed their party’s name so frequently, there may have not been enough time for 
                                            
3 Note on Names: Following customs in the use of personal names, this study presents American or 
Western surnames first, and their given names follow in the text and notes. Yet, Korean and Asian 
names are reversed: their surname or family names come first, and given names follow them (Shin 
1999a). In the case of authors’ names, their first initials and last names are used because there are many 
common surnames among Koreans. In the references, however, presentation of names is the same, 
regardless of whether it is an Asian or Western name. Names in the references are noted according to 
the Style Manual for Political Science (American Political Science Association. Committee on 
Publications. 2001). 
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voters to develop genuine party identification, as voters have in the U.S.4 Instead, 
voters have developed a strong attachment to their regional leader. 
Moreover, “regional parties” cement party-centered politics (Clark 1988; Kang 
1998; Lee and Brunn 1996; Lee 1993a; Morriss 1996; Park 1993a; b). The importance 
of a “regional party” reinforces the dominant influence of party leaders in Korean 
politics. A regional party means that the formation and importance of specific parties 
covaries in a regional context with voters often casting votes in line with the “regional 
party.” Recent electoral outcomes in Korea suggest that there are three regions that 
tend to exhibit partisan regionalism: Cholla, Kyungsang, and Chungchong. The 
Cholla region covers the Chunbuk and Chunnam areas. The Kyungsang region 
consists of the Kyoungbuk and Kyungsang areas, and the Chungchong region means 
the Chungbuk and Chungnam areas (See Figure 1).5
                                            
4 Perhaps no other countries have experienced party mergers and splits more frequently than Korea. 
Between January 1963 and January 2000, 82 parties have been formed. This means that about 2.2 
parties have been built every year (The Korea Central Daily January 21, 2000). Yet, the parties are not 
totally new. They simply change their names while excluding or including some politicians. For 
instance, the Democratic Republican Party was formed by former president Park Jung-hee and 
disappeared with his death (1963-1980). Current president Roh Moo-hyun constructed the Uri Party 
(2004-current), the current ruling party. Former president Kim Dae-jung constructed the Party for 
Peace and Democracy (1971-1990), the Democratic Party (1990-1992), the National Congress for New 
Politics (1995-2000), and the Millennium Democratic Party (2000-present). Former president Kim 
Young-sam created the Unification and Democracy Party (1987-1990) and the Grand National Party 
(1995-present). Another famous Korean politician, Kim Jong-pil, put together the United Liberal 
Democrats (1995-present). 
5 Regional dominance by a particular party was specified in terms of the birthplace of particular party 
leaders. Park Jung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, and Kim Young-sam were bon in Kyungsang 
province (southeast area); Kim Dae-jung in Cholla province (southwest area); and Kim Jong-pil in 
Chungchong province (central area). They were elected president by voters from their home provinces, 
with the exception of Kim Jong-pil. The regional conflicts occur most seriously between Cholla and 
Kyungsang provinces. This link between the birthplace of a party leader and the dominance of a 
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Figure 1: Major Cities and Provinces in Korean Peninsula 
Source: Government of the Republic of Korea. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2005. 
                                                                                                                             
particular party is well documented in contemporary Korean politics (Lee and Brunn 1996; Lee 1997). 
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Regionalism6 engenders the expectation that voters will be receptive to 
appeals for support composed by political elites who share with them a common 
identification with a geographical region. In this way, Korean politics can become 
regionally “personalist,” or “caesaristic,” where political leaders are the “favorite 
sons” of regional voters, destined to be their protectors and benefactors against 
unwarranted and unsettling claims from other regions (Morriss 1996).7  
For example, voters whose hometown is in the Kyungsang region are likely to 
vote for a candidate of the “hometown party.” Since this appears to happen regardless 
of the quality of candidate or the ideology of party, voting patterns result in parties 
often being representatives of regions instead of districts of the nation. In such regions, 
if a candidate runs in an election bearing the “correct” regional party label for a 
particular region, then the probability of winning the election is extremely high. Thus, 
being nominated by party leaders in the correct place becomes, de facto, associated 
                                            
6 The term “regionalism” is used in a variety of ways in the literature. For example, it sometimes refers 
to cultural characteristics that distinguish regions, while at other times it may refer to stereotyping and 
prejudices directed against people living in regions other than one’s own (e.g., Yu 1990). Here I shall 
interpret the concept of regionalism more narrowly as referring to alignments of voters from particular 
geographical regions. In other words, regionalism refers to political antagonisms among regions 
primarily manifested as confrontational regionalist voting in which voters cast their vote for candidates 
or parties only because they are based in their own regions. 
7 The first regional voting is said to have appeared in the 1963 presidential election when Park Jung-
hee and Yoon Po-sun competed. Also, there were regional differences in the 1971 presidential election. 
Kim Dae-jung, who is a favorite son of the Cholla province, obtained a greater proportion of votes in 
Cholla than nationwide. However, the magnitude was incomparably small. Therefore, many scholars 
who study regionalism in Korea note the strong and enduring regionalism after 1987.  
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with being elected. 
In the most extreme case, as seen in Table 1, the presidential candidate Kim 
Dae-jung, who is from the Cholla province (which is located at the southwestern part 
of Korea) gained 94.4% of the votes in that province in the 1997 presidential election. 
In 1997, Lee Hoi-chang won 59.1 percent of the votes in the southeastern part of the 
country, while winning only 3.3 % of votes in the Cholla region. In the 2002 
presidential election, the winning candidate Roh Moo-hyun, originally from the 
Kyungsang region and representing Kim Dae-jung’s party, won 93.2 % of the votes in  
 
Table 1: Regional Voting in the 1997 and 2002 Korean Presidential Elections (%) 
1997 2002 
Region Lee Hoi-
changa 
Kim Dae-
jungb 
Lee In-
jec 
Lee Hoi-
changa 
Roh Moo-
hyund 
Seoul/Incheon/Kyunggi 38.3 42.0 18.1 44.6 50.9 
Kyungsang 59.1 13.5 25.1 69.4 25.8 
Kangwon 43.2 23.8 30.9 52.9 41.5 
Cholla 3.3 94.4 1.5 4.9 93.2 
Chungchong 27.4 43.9 26.6 41.3 52.5 
Cheju 36.6 40.6 20.4 39.9 56.1 
Overall 38.7 40.3 19.2 46.6 48.9 
Source: Korean National Election Commission (www.nec.go.kr) 
a The candidate of the Grand National Party (GNP).  
b The candidate of New Politics Peoples’ Assembly (NPPA), which is the direct 
descendant of the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) 
c The candidate of the National New Party (NNP) 
d The candidate of the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) 
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the Cholla region but only 25.8% of the votes in the Kyungsang region. Regional 
voting arises from regional factors such as a sense of regional belonging, personal 
attachment to regional leaders, ideologically induced regional nepotism, or expected 
individual benefits from improved regional conditions. 
Most regional voting differences are closely related to ethnic, linguistic or 
religious differences similar to those seen in many European countries such as 
Switzerland and Belgium (Lijphart 1979). However, regional voting in Korea is 
unique. Korea is one of the most homogeneous nations in the world. The tendency of 
voters to support candidates on the basis of a party leader’s regional connection has 
been extremely strong; therefore, most Korean scholars agree that regionalism is the 
most serious and persistent obstacle to progress in the country (Bae and Cotton 1993; 
Cho 2000; Lee 1997; Shin 1999b).8 The argument concludes that if politics based on 
regional interests persists, there is little hope that Korean political institutions will 
mature sufficiently to meet the political and economic requirements of a modern 
democratic society.   
In sum, concentrations of votes along regional party lines reflect the regional 
                                            
8 Why regionalism appears is beyond the scope of this research since I focus on the political 
consequences (political sophistication and party identification) of regionalism. In explaining the cause 
of regionalism, analysts have focused on a variety of cultural (Choi and Lee 1980; Kim and Koh 1980; 
Yang 1994; Yea 1994), economic (Cho 2000; Kim 1987; Kim 1990; Moon 1990), mobilization 
strategic factors (Choi 1993; Moon 1992; Sohn 1993), although they are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. See Kang (2001). 
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nature of Korean parties (Cho 1998; Kang 2001; Lee and Brunn 1996; Lee 1997). The 
centralized leadership of Korean parties and their regional bases are indicative of 
party centered politics in Korea. Korean political parties can be seen, therefore, as 
dominating most candidates’ electoral fortunes. Party support for a candidate is 
important because Korean voters heavily rely upon the party label of candidates when 
making their electoral choice (Cho 1998; Lee and Brunn 1996; Lee 1997). 
Additionally, the importance of party voting cues can become enhanced when there is 
a strong linkage between a particular party and a particular region. In this context, the 
concept of party identification has been met quite critically in Korean electoral 
research. This is quite different from Americans politics, in particular in presidential 
elections, where the policy stands and characteristics of the candidates have an 
important weight in addition to their party background.  
Party identification is a cost saving device, providing people with a shortcut to 
all kinds of decisions, including the decision for which party or candidate to vote 
(Downs 1957). However, Korean voters might not need party identification as a cost 
saving device, because that function was already fulfilled by people’s ties to a region, 
which in turn was strongly associated with a particular party. Under these conditions 
expressed partisanship will be synonymous with the vote, and parties as such will not 
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serve as a guide to organize behavior. The logical extension of this argument might be 
that once the importance of regional cleavages declines and voters are deprived of 
their traditional shortcutting device, they will develop party identification in the same 
way as their American counterparts.    
Korea undertook the transition to democracy with an ample reservoir of 
distrust for political parties due to decades of experience with authoritarian and 
military regimes. Korean critics maintain that Korean citizens usually do not think 
and deliberate about issues and lack the sophistication to do so. In particular, 
regionalism persists in the political processes of Korea, which hurts Korean 
democracy. There has been growing concern across a wide spectrum of Korean 
society, as well as among politicians and political scientists, about the implications of 
regionalism for sustainable democracy in Korea (Cho 1998; 2000; Kang 1993; Lee 
1997; Park 2000; Park 2001). In fact, most studies of Korean elections have 
concluded that regionalism explains all elections in Korea.  
However, growing interest in political and economic reform has recently led to 
changes in voting behavior. Past research suggests that country level factors such as 
democratic experience, the party system, strategic voting incentives, and the nature of 
social groups may influence the development and consequences of party identification 
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(Bowler, Lanoue, and Savoie 1994; Campbell et al. 1960; Crewe 1976; Green, 
Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller 1976; Niemi and Weisberg 2001). Park (1993a, 
453) finds the impact of issue voting with a statistical analysis of survey data from the 
1992 presidential election. Korean voters took into account their retrospective 
evaluations and the campaign issues of the candidates. Indeed, there is some 
preliminary empirical evidence to suggest that among Koreans the probability of 
partisan identification can be influenced by an individual’s economic and educational 
circumstances.  
In the 2002 presidential election, Roh Moo-hyun, the 16th President of Korea, 
won 48.9% (12,014,277 votes) of the valid ballots cast (24,561,916 votes) beating 
first runner-up Lee Hoi-chang by a margin of 2.3 percent (570,980 votes).9 Since this 
election, a number of scholars and election experts have noticed a gradual decline of 
regionalism, but an increase of generational gap and policy voting. This election 
signals an end to the politics of three Kims10 generation. A new generation of 
                                            
9 Many aspects of Roh’s victory over Lee made subsequent governing difficult. The small margin of 
victory made it more difficult for the losing side to accept the election result. Consequently, on March 
12, 2004, a stunning political event happened in Korea as its National Assembly impeached President 
Roh Moo-hyun only a year into his term as President. The opposition parties -- with over two-thirds of 
the seats in the Assembly -- decided to use their numerical strength only one month before the National 
Assembly elections. As a result of the impeachment, the case was sent to the Constitutional Court for a 
final decision according to the Korean constitution. Roh’s presidential powers were immediately 
suspended and Prime Minister Koh Gun became acting head of state. The opposition’s reason for the 
impeachment was the President’s public expression of support for the governing Uri Party for the 
upcoming National Assembly elections and his refusal to publicly apologize for his conduct as the 
position demanded.   
10 Three Kims are Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-pil. They dominated Korean Politics 
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politicians have put their stamp on Korean politics. Post-modern and post-materialist 
political issues such as gender equality, environmental protection, peace, and civil 
society came to the fore of the political agenda. Moreover, after the 1987 election, 
issues such as the economy, democratization, and corruption became significant 
factors in Korean voting behavior (Cho 2002; Cho 2000; Kim and Kim 2000; Lee 
1998). 
To summarize, new voting behavior certainly emerged in Korea in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Specifically, issue voting appears to be on the rise in Korea (Cho 2002; 
Cho 2000; Kim and Kim 2000; Lee 1998). Moreover, Korean voters often vote for the 
party that maximizes their interests, as voters do in other democratic societies (Cho 
1998; Lee and Brunn 1996; Lee 1997).  
As a result of these changes in voting behavior, I believe, a peaceful power 
transfer from the ruling party to an opposition party took place for the first time in 
Korea’s history in 1997. Considering a long electoral history, the shift in power was a 
miraculous event. Three government changes – intraparty changes in 1993 and 2002, 
and an interparty change in 1997 – have since taken place through three procedurally 
free and fair presidential elections. Assuming that sophisticated voters in Korea are 
                                                                                                                             
for four decades after the military coup d’état of 1961. 
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not likely to be mobilized in the ways they were under authoritarian regimes, I expect 
that more sophisticated individuals rely less on region and “boss” cues than less 
sophisticated voters. This is a meaningful clue that voters differ markedly in their 
understanding and conceptualization of politics, and this variation is likely to 
influence how political sophistication affects voting behavior.  
This assumption raises important questions about the influence of political 
sophistication on the use of heuristics. For example, does the use of partisan cues 
depend on an individual’s level of political sophistication? Do informed voters always 
focus on sophisticated comparisons of candidates and issues without reference to 
party identification? To answer these questions we need to understand how political 
sophisticates and unsophisticates think about politics. South Korea’s 2002 presidential 
election is an interesting test case for this approach to explaining the electoral impact 
of political sophistication on the use of partisan cues. 
There are, to my knowledge, no empirical studies that analyze the effects of 
political sophistication on South Korean voting behavior. Very little is known about 
the role of political sophistication in South Korean elections and how environmental 
variation may affect its distribution. With a few exceptions research on political 
sophistication has focused mostly on the United States. Empirical studies on political 
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sophistication are nearly nonexistent in Korean scholarship.  
 
1.3 Outline, and Contribution of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is a study of Korean voting behavior in the 2002 presidential 
election. In this dissertation, I analyze how Korean citizens make their vote choices. I 
focus on the level of political sophistication in the electorate and the use of partisan 
heuristics. The purpose of this dissertation is to study the effects of political 
sophistication on partisan cues in the 2002 Korean presidential election. 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter I provides the introduction, 
which includes a research question, background information on electoral studies in 
Korean politics, and an outline of this dissertation. In Chapter II, I begin by defining 
political sophistication and reviewing previous work on political sophistication and 
cognitive heuristics. Then I examine the relationship between political sophistication 
and partisan cues, focusing on the relationship between the level of political 
sophistication and the use of the partisan heuristic. Building on prior literature, I move 
to significantly expand our understanding of how political sophistication influences 
voters’ decision and the use of partisan cues. 
Chapter III explores the factors that determine the levels of political 
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sophistication and use of partisan cues. I also describe my dependent and independent 
variables. Next, I address methods of studying the relationship between political 
sophistication and the use of the partisan cues, voter turnout, and electoral choice in 
the 2002 Korean presidential election. Chapter IV presents and interprets the results 
of my empirical analyses. The purpose of Chapter IV is to probe the effects of 
political sophistication on the use of partisan cues in Korea in the 2002 presidential 
election. I investigate how the use of the partisan heuristic is conditioned by an 
individual’s level of political sophistication. Finally, Chapter V sums up my findings 
and offers concluding observations about the effects of political sophistication on 
partisan voting and their implications. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on political sophistication in three 
ways. First, it improves our understanding of the effects of different levels of 
sophistication on the use of partisan cues. My goal is to contribute to the debate over 
the effects of political sophistication on the use of the partisan heuristic. I also 
examine the impact of political sophistication on the evaluative processes of voters 
and their choices. Most of the extant literature has omitted sophistication as an 
explanatory variable, instead assuming that voters make evaluations and decisions in 
roughly the same way regardless of their level of sophistication. By allowing the 
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impact of key explanatory variables to vary depending on the respondent’s level of 
sophistication, we can see how voters’ differing abilities to make informed political 
evaluations affect the decisions they make. 
Second, this study advances our understanding of the development of 
partisanship. While party identification has long attracted the attention of scholars, 
most research has focused on established democracies, in particular the United States 
(Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Such studies, however, are limited in their ability to 
test empirical predictions regarding the development of partisan attachments. Indeed, 
to explore these questions fully we need data from new democracies like Korea, 
where we can actually observe citizens as they become attached to political parties. 
For observers of Korean politics an accurate assessment of mass partisanship can shed 
light on the promise of stability in the fledgling democracy. For students of democracy, 
newly competitive political systems offer an extraordinary opportunity to learn about 
the origins of partisanship. These studies on the acquisition of party attachments in 
new democracies are particularly important given the prevalence of arguments that 
partisanship enhances prospects of democratic consolidation (Almond and Verba 
1963; Converse 1969; Converse and Dupeux 1962; Mainwaring 1999). So I 
contribute to a more general understanding of how mass partisanship develops related 
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to political sophistication. 
Third, my dissertation explores the universality of political sophistication; that 
is, it examines whether or not political sophistication is a meaningful concept outside 
the United States. While there are good reasons to believe that sophistication plays an 
important role in the decision-making of voters worldwide, few scholars have 
examined this role to confirm its apparent universality. Recent research in the United 
States and elsewhere has highlighted disparities in political sophistication within the 
general population, as well as how these disparities might be alleviated (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996; Holbrook 2002). So far, however, this research has been confined to 
established democratic systems. As a result, scholars know little about disparities in 
political sophistication in other countries, especially emerging democracies.  
In most emerging democracies overall levels of political sophistication tend to 
be low, inequalities of all kinds are pronounced, and the overall quality of political 
representation is dubious. By measuring and testing the impact of sophistication in a 
very distinct electoral context, we can determine whether sophistication is truly a 
universal concept or if it is simply an artifact of the American political system.
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Chapter II. Literature Review 
 
The discussion of political sophistication is important in the study of voting behavior 
and political psychology (Niemi and Weisberg 2001). The pioneering studies of 
Lazarsfeld et al (1944) at Columbia University and Campbell et al (1960) at the 
University of Michigan generated a prolific research agenda that has been followed 
for over half a century. Though scholars disagree about how information or 
knowledge affects vote choice, some hypotheses have been supported by robust 
empirical testing. 
The discussion has centered on whether this is a problem or not for democratic 
systems. Many studies are pessimistic. But the “new look” in public opinion research 
dispensed with reflexive pessimism (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991; 
Sniderman 1993) and accepted instead that “the reasoning voter” might rely on 
cognitive shortcuts or heuristic cues to form meaningful appraisals of candidates and 
issues without expending excessive cognitive resources (Popkin 1994; Sniderman, 
Brody, and Tetlock 1991b; Zaller 1992).  
A great deal of scholarship has investigated the utility of party labels as 
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heuristic devices in various domains. In terms of voting, scholars have found that 
people rely on partisan cues in the voting booth (Lau and Redlawsk 2001a; Popkin 
1994; Rahn 1993), especially in low information elections (Schaffner and Streb 2002; 
Squire and Smith 1988). So long as the positions of candidates are not inconsistent 
with those of the party, voters are likely to select the “correct” candidate if they are 
provided with the party of the candidate (Lau and Redlawsk 2001a; Rahn 1993). 
Furthermore, scholars have found that party cues help citizens predict the issue 
positions of candidates and place them on an ideological spectrum (Conover and 
Feldman 1981; 1989; Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Kahn 1994; Koch 2001; Lodge and 
Hamill 1986; Rahn 1993; Wright and Niemi 1983).  
In this context, the possibility of the use of party as a heuristic by voters has 
been acknowledged in political science for over 40 years. The concept of party 
identification offered one explanation for how the average individual managed the 
complexities of democratic politics. Downs (1957) pointed out that party 
identifications constitute a crucial information shortcut for voters. Lau and Redlawsk 
(2001a) also find the party identification is the most important heuristic.11 Party 
                                            
11 According to Lau and Redlawsk (2001a), the following possible shortcuts and heuristics can be 
identified; 1) Relying on party affiliation, 2) Relying on a candidates/party ideology for cognitive 
savings, and 3) Endorsements. The second shortcut is a slightly similar heuristic as the party heuristic. 
However, it is not so much the party label but the connotation of conservative/progressive that is used 
to make a political choice. And “Endorsements” means using the opinion of interest groups, or 
respected individuals etc. to make a choice. Voters can simply use the recommendation of interest 
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identification is purportedly among the most useful of such aids because it is very 
accessible and “travels so well” across different decision domains (Huckfeldt et al. 
1999). In fact, nearly every theory of voting includes party identification as a critical 
factor explaining vote choice. Even when information about candidates is in short 
supply, voters can rely on partisan information.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I review the relevant literature. I begin with a 
discussion of the concept of political sophistication, and then focus on several 
cognitive shortcuts or heuristics. I use this literature review as a basis for discussing 
the predicted effects of political sophistication on the use of cognitive shortcuts or 
heuristics.  
 
2.1 The Concept of Political Sophistication, and Empirical Studies 
Citizens use a variety of means to evaluate the political world and guide 
political choice. Scholars have proposed differentiating voters according to their 
“levels of conceptualization” (Campbell et al. 1960), “belief systems” (Converse 
1964), “education” (Carmines and Stimson 1980), “level of political sophistication” 
(Luskin 1987), “political awareness” (Zaller 1992), and so on.  
                                                                                                                             
groups and/or individuals to make their mind up and do not need to inform themselves about the party 
programmer. 
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Political sophistication can broadly be defined as the understanding of politics. 
Political sophistication is related to the ability to “comprehend the political world and 
develop attitudes about politics that are consistent with one’s basic values and 
orientations” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 2000, 23). More specifically, politically 
sophisticated individuals should be able to evaluate effectively politics in terms of 
competing interests and actors, and make associative and causal linkages between 
these factors. Political sophisticates identify political problems, locate the sources of 
the problems, and determine potential solutions. There is also an expectation that 
political sophisticates are engaged in politics. To be adept at assessing the political 
landscape there must be ongoing attention paid to political issues and actors. 
In the same context, political sophistication can be also defined as the 
conjunction of interest in politics, knowledge about public affairs, and conceptual 
skill in organizing and using this knowledge in making sense of the political universe. 
Political interest is the extent to which people follow political news and developments, 
and the amount of concern and involvement they have with the political world 
(Krosnick 1990; Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992). Political knowledge refers to knowing 
what government is, how government functions, and being familiar with the roles and 
positions taken by prominent public actors and groups (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
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1993; Luskin 1987; Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992). Conceptualization is defined as the 
ability to differentiate between types of political information and to integrate this 
information into a wide-ranging associative network (Converse 1964; Luskin 1987; 
Neuman 1986; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a).  
Political sophistication enhances the extent to which people comprehend 
politics and make attributions. Sophisticates understand the complexities of political 
problems, while non-sophisticates may cease looking after encountering an obvious 
answer. Because political sophisticates are able to think about politics outside their 
own local sphere of reference, they have a comprehensive, more complex 
understanding of politics. Due to their frequent attention to politics, sophisticates must 
constantly update their assessments in order to maintain an overall evaluation of 
beliefs. When new information comes in, it must be integrated with the existing 
disparate sets of knowledge. That new information comes in frequently and 
integration with existing beliefs must occur often. 
Political sophistication is a concept introduced by Campbell et al. (1960) to 
describe the extent to which voters conceptualized their likes and dislikes about 
candidates and parties in ideological terms (although they did not directly employ that 
term). Campbell et al. (1960) stratified survey respondents according to their “levels 
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of conceptualization,” representing the degree to which voters employ ideological 
language in explaining their attitudes towards parties and candidates. They described 
what they sought to measure as follows:  
  
We are interested in the presence or absence of certain abstractions that have to 
do with ideology; but we are also interested in the degree to which an 
individual’s political world is differentiated, and, most important, in the nature 
of the degree of “connectedness” between the elements that are successfully 
discriminated. In short, we are interested in the structure of thought that the 
individual applies to politics; and this interest forces us to deal in typologies 
and qualitative differences (Campbell et al. 1960, 221-2). 
 
They develop a system for evaluating the level of conceptualization at which 
individuals understand and integrate bits of political knowledge. This system has four 
categories, from a low group with a complete absence of issue content in their 
political information structure, to a high group that relies on an overarching ideology 
to organize political information.12 
Converse (1964) expanded on and revised the levels of conceptualization and 
introduced the concept of a “belief system” to generalize the concept of ideology used 
                                            
12 Meanwhile, the social-psychological school downplays the ideological dimension of voting, whereas 
the rational choice school begins with that dimension The American Voter model holds that political 
ideology matters only when voters show a consistent cognitive attitude structure. Campbell el al. (1960, 
Ch 10, Table 10-1) show that only 2.5 percent of the American public actively relies on the ideological 
dimension, while 88.5 percent of the public shows at best a minimal understanding of ideology. The 
authors contend that they could not find any significant evidence showing that voters understand the 
diverse aspects of ideology. 
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by Campbell et al. Converse (1976) examines the extent to which individuals use their 
overarching beliefs to constrain their attitudes on particular issues. He defined a belief 
system as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound 
together by some form of constraint or functional dependence” (Converse 1964, 207). 
Converse argues that the level of constraint in a person’s belief system is largely a 
function of the level of information that individual possesses. By information he 
means both simple facts and the “contextual knowledge” or essential relationships 
between those facts (Converse 1964, 212-3).  
While there is much debate about Converse’s assumptions about and 
measurements of belief constraint, the idea that sophisticated individuals use a general 
theory about the world to structure particular opinions is closely tied to Campbell et 
al.’s (1960) levels of conceptualization. This definition of sophistication centers on 
the ability of an individual to use broad-spectrum ideologies to shape specific 
decisions. 
Converse noted that high levels of sophistication according to both measures 
were associated with higher levels of political activity and education, consistent with 
the findings of Campbell et al. Converse (1964) found little consistency between 
respondents’ political attitudes, suggesting that not only do citizens fail to organize 
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their political attitudes consistently around the ideological dimensions assumed by 
most political scientists, but they also fail to organize their thoughts about politics in a 
consistent matter at all. The implication of these and related findings was that the 
American electorate was hardly capable of making reasonable decisions. 
Although variously defined and operationalized in the succeeding literature, at 
its core political sophistication has been used to refer to the extent to which voters 
think in ideological terms – that is, the extent to which they represent and evaluate 
information in categories differentiated in terms of liberalism and conservatism. This 
conception of the ideologue is the basis for much of the research on political 
sophistication since the 1960s (Luskin 1987). The basis for this classification is 
cognitive in nature. The sophisticated voter understands the political world in terms of 
a more general political belief system, or an overarching theory used to interpret 
political surroundings (Converse 1964). 
The concept of political sophistication in terms of the levels of 
conceptualization continued to have some currency in the literature throughout the 
1970s. Pierce (1970), Pierce and Hagner (1982) and Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976) 
used Campbell et al.’s levels of conceptualization in various forms to illustrate the 
changing role of ideology in voters making political decisions, arguing that voters had 
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in general increased their sophistication in the 1960s and 1970s.13 Many researchers 
build on operationalizations of definitions based on Converse (1976) and Campbell et 
al. (1960), including issue congruence and ideology (Luskin 1987). What is clear, 
however, is that there is not a consensus as to what political sophistication is, what it 
should be, and how it should be measured (Luskin 1987). 
Meanwhile, Carmines and Stimson (1980) introduced another factor, 
“education” to explain levels of political sophistication. Carmines and Stimson (1980) 
argue that an increase in issue voting during the 1960s was not the result of a better-
informed electorate. Carmines and Stimson differentiate between “easy issues” and 
‘hard issues.” “Easy issues” are those issues that even uninterested and less informed 
voters have opinions about. An easy issue is: 1) “symbolic rather than technical,” 2) 
“more likely to deal with policy ends than means,” and 3) “an issue long on the 
political agenda” (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 80). Only “hard issues” require 
conscious calculation of policy benefits and thus are the basis for more sophisticated 
and reasoned electoral choice. They posit that the likelihood of voting on “hard 
issues” is greater among voters who are better educated and/or better informed.  
Sniderman, Glaser and Griffin (1990) compare voters without a high-school 
                                            
13 These works, however, were strongly criticized by Smith (1980), who argued that voters in general 
were no more ideological or sophisticated than they were at the time of The American Voter.  
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diploma to those with some college education in their study of voting in the 1980 
presidential election. Their main findings are: (1) in deciding how to vote, less 
educated voters rely more heavily on incumbent approval, while well educated voters 
rely more heavily on the comparative competence of the candidates and on their own 
policy goals; (2) less educated voters rely more heavily on partisan considerations in 
judging both the incumbent’s performance and the comparative competence of 
candidates; and (3) well educated voters rely more heavily on economic 
retrospections and policy goals in judging the incumbent’s performance, and rely 
more heavily on ideological considerations to judge the candidates’ comparative 
competence and to determine policy goals. 
Zaller (1990, 131) discusses awareness as playing a role in “reception of 
political messages and … the availability of these messages in memory.” He notes 
that the concept of political awareness is perhaps best measured by political 
information (as opposed to measures including education, reported media exposure, 
and political participation), because it “captures political learning that has actually 
occurred – that is, political ideas that have been encountered and comprehended and 
remain available for use” (Zaller 1990, 131). 
Zaller (1992) states that the best measures of “political attentiveness” are 
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factual knowledge questions that “capture what’s gotten into people’s minds,” 
although he supplements these measures with education and other proxies when 
knowledge questions are not available. To measure the public’s understanding of 
politics it is necessary to identify an appropriate gauge of political awareness or 
sophistication. Zaller makes the case for the use of questions of “neutral factual 
knowledge,” arguing that: 
 
Neutral factual knowledge about politics captures political learning that has 
actually occurred, political ideals that the individual has encountered, 
understood, and stored in his head, while avoiding the problems associated with 
social desirability, response effects, and over-estimation associated with most 
subjective assessments of political understanding (Zaller 1992, 335).  
 
Delli Carpini and Keeter have carried out the most extensive and recent study 
of the American electorate. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) perform a series of 
studies to determine what Americans know about politics. They advance four 
propositions to help answer this question. First, the American political system is built 
upon a variety of inconsistent normative theories. Second, “Factual knowledge about 
politics is a critical component of citizenship” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 3). 
Third, what, how much, and how citizens know about politics is distributed among 
different groups of citizens based on individual and systemic forces. Finally, “varied 
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opportunities to participate; the centrality of information to effective participation; 
and systematic biases in the ability, opportunity and motivation to learn about politics 
combine to produce a stratified political system that affords different access to 
political power” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 3-4). These propositions are central 
to their book, as it is hard to evaluate their work apart from them. 
They focus on three categories representing the components of politics about 
which citizens should know: “what government is” (the rules of the game), “what 
government does” (the substance of politics), and “who government is” (people and 
parties in politics). Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993; 1996) use a five-item measure of 
political knowledge, assessing the voter’s correct answers on the following: party 
control of the House, the relative ideological location of the two major parties, the 
size of supermajority required to override a presidential veto, identification of the vice 
president, and identification of the branch of government responsible for striking 
down laws as unconstitutional.14 
                                            
14 Gomez and Wilson (2001) employ a similar eight-item measure of political sophistication in the 
1992 election; they drop the relative ideological locations altogether, and employ four name-and-office 
identification questions (Dan Quayle again, plus Boris Yeltsin, Tom Foley, and William Rehnquist), 
two civics questions (judicial review and judicial nominations), and party control of both House and 
Senate. Because Gomez and Wilson’s study is of economic voting, the version of sophistication they 
must employ must stratify voters according to the ability to make causal associations; they explain that 
attributing credit and blame requires both sufficient factual knowledge to understand the legislative 
process and the capacity to think abstractly about cause-and-effect. Their strongest findings are that in 
1992, more sophisticated voters were more likely than unsophisticated voters both to blame 
government for their personal economic circumstances and to engage in pocketbook voting in the 1992 
presidential election; unsophisticated voters instead voted according to sociotropic retrospections.  
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The Delli Carpini and Keeter scale has become the standard measure of 
political knowledge, which seems to be synonymous with Zaller’s “political 
attentiveness,” and political sophistication. Consequently, the contemporary study of 
political sophistication increasingly focuses on the importance of factual political 
knowledge when assessing what the public knows about politics, recognizing 
knowledge to be “both an important political resource in its own right and a facilitator 
of other forms of political and thus, indirectly, socioeconomic power (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996). By assessing the “range of factual information about politics stored 
in long-term memory,” political knowledge is suggested to be the “most important 
component of a broader notion of political sophistication” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996). 
Delli Carpini and Keeter assess the overall knowledge of American voters by 
summarizing the results of a large sample of surveys between 1940 and 1994. In total, 
there are 448 factual questions about institutions and processes, people and players, 
domestic and foreign affairs. The ability of the electorate to answer correctly varies 
from 99 percent (e.g., naming the president of the U.S.) to 1 percent (e.g., naming the 
prime minister of Norway). On average, the voters manage to give the correct answer 
to 41 percent of the questions (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 62-104). They discover 
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that Americans do not know much by any measure about any of these categories, and 
never have known that much. However, they argue that it does not follow that the 
American public consists of a bunch of ignoramuses. Instead, they argue that it is 
meaningless to talk about how much Americans know about politics because enough 
citizens know enough about politics to evaluate candidate, parties, and issues (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996). 
Scholars have provided evidence that demonstrates how political 
sophistication conditions political thought and judgment (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996; Knight 1985; Krosnick 1990; Lau 1985; Luskin 1987; Neuman 1986; 
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a). According to this emerging body of research, 
what one knows and how deeply one thinks about politics strongly affect political 
information processing and choice.  
To take some examples, sophistication leads to higher levels of policy attitude 
holding (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Goren 1997; Jacoby 1995; Krosnick 1990)15, 
attitude structure and stability (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; 
Norpoth and Lodge 1985; Stimson 1975), ideological reasoning (Converse 1964; 
                                            
15 For instance, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) show that experts are much more likely than novices 
to make judgments about the policy positions held by public officials, candidates for office, and the two 
major parties, which can be viewed as a form of attitude expression. Jacoby (1995) shows that 
increasing sophistication leads to increasing attitude expression across a wide range of ideological, 
domestic policy, and foreign policy issues.  
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Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a; Stimson 
1975), information processing efficiency (Lodge and Hamill 1986; McGraw, Lodge, 
and Stroh 1990), campaign contributions (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), and voter 
turnout (Neuman 1986).  
Sophistication also makes people more likely to judge political messages by 
their content rather than their sources (Iyengar and Valentino 2000). The sophisticated 
are more likely to resist weak or specious counterarguments, they are more 
susceptible to priming effects (Krosnick and Berent 1993), more likely to vote along 
party lines (Zaller 1992), and more likely to decide on a candidate months in advance 
of an election (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Moreover, sophisticates are more 
likely to make voting decisions on a broad array of factors, with a higher propensity to 
“use issues as a criterion” (Brady and Ansolabehere 1989; Sniderman, Brody, and 
Tetlock 1991a). Most importantly, perhaps, sophistication enhances one’s ability to 
determine his/her “enlightened” self interest, which is the decision one would make 
with full and perfect information and if one could fully preview the results of each 
alternative (Dahl 1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter 2000). 
Palfrey and Poole (1987) perform empirical study of the relationship between 
voter sophistication and how respondents to the 1980 NES voted in the 1980 
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presidential election. They did this by performing a series of Monte Carlo simulations 
on their dataset in which they varied each individual’s level of information. They 
discovered that individuals with a high level of information tend to hold more 
politically extreme views than those with lower levels of information (Palfrey and 
Poole 1987). Second, they found that those with more information are more likely to 
vote. These findings imply that sophistication effects exist in a few different ways, as 
those with more information hold different political views than those who are less 
informed. Moreover, more extreme voters are more likely to vote in a presidential 
election. 
Lau and Redlawsk (1997) build upon online and memory-based voting models 
by asking what determines whether people vote correctly. Lau and Redlawsk defined 
a correct vote as, “one that is the same as a choice that would have been made under 
conditions of full information” (Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 586). They test their 
research question by examining the results of a 1994 experiment in which 303 eligible 
voters were subjected to a mock election campaign (Lau and Redlawsk 1997). After 
the election campaign, they voted in the “primary” election campaign and afterward, 
were given complete information about the candidates in question. They analyzed the 
results of this experiment and found that new information changes how people vote in 
 
 
 
40
an election (Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 591). They also tested their research question on 
NES data on presidential elections between 1972 and 1998 and obtained results 
consistent with those of their experiment as new information altered how people voted 
in these elections (Lau and Redlawsk 1997). Their results imply that information 
effects exist as new information changes how people vote. 
Finally, Althaus (1998; 2003) extends Delli Carpini and Keeter’s (1996) and 
Bartels’s works by looking at NES data from the 1988, 1992, and 1996 NES to 
determine whether having more information alters a person’s response to a survey 
question. He examines survey respondents’ responses to various policy questions to 
determine the role of information in shaping an individual’s responses. Moreover, he 
controls for a variety of demographic factors like income, age, partisanship and the 
like (Althaus 1998; 2003). Further, he simulates the effect of having more information 
on societal preferences by setting each individual’s level of information to the highest 
available. He discovers that those who have more information are more likely to have 
a different set of political preferences than those with less information (Althaus 1998; 
2003). As a result of this finding, he finds support that favors information effects in 
NES responses to policy questions. 
To summarize, political scientists have demonstrated a long-standing concern 
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with identifying how well the American electorate understands politics, recognizing 
political sophistication as the cornerstone of effective democratic participation (Dahl 
1967; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). It is generally understood that the level of 
political knowledge in the American electorate is very low (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
1996; Sniderman 1993). In effect, as Zaller (1992) points out, people vary greatly in 
their general attentiveness to politics, and by and large, the overall level of 
information is limited.16 
Empirical evidence suggests that some kinds of people tend to be more 
informed than others. That is, there is an important amount of variance in the level of 
factual political knowledge among citizens, and this variance is said to be unevenly 
distributed, since the highest degree of political knowledge tends to be concentrated 
among those who are politically and socially advantaged. In fact, according to the 
literature much of the empirical variation in the propensity to know about politics is 
explained by individual differences in motivation, ability, and opportunity (Althaus 
2003; Bennett 1995; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). At this point, then, the general 
assumption of the theories of voting behavior that all citizens are similarly informed 
needs to be tested. 
                                            
16 Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) estimate the proportion of high sophisticates at around 30%. 
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Nonetheless, the early literature was largely silent on the question of how 
evaluation and voting decisions are actually made, given that voters rely on 
incomplete information. Survey research is strikingly uniform in its conclusions 
regarding the ignorance of the public. Subsequent work did establish that information 
levels fluctuate over time (Bennett 1988), but no one disputes the long-established 
fact that most voters are politically ignorant (Althaus 1998; 2003; Converse 1964; 
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992). 
The recent focus on political sophistication presents an opportunity to think of 
sophistication in new ways. In essence, this research agenda resurrects the role of 
citizens and their preferences in the practice of politics. That is, rather than lament the 
lack of political sophistication, this process-centered approach depicts citizens as 
neither fools nor philosophers. Instead, citizen preferences, while not well-informed, 
are not random, whimsical, inconsistent or ill-founded. This research challenges the 
minimalists’ claims by arguing that citizens can make reasonable choices with limited 
information through the use of information shortcuts, or heuristics (Downs 1957; 
Hinich and Munger 1994; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985; 1986; Neuman 1986; Page 
and Shapiro 1992; Popkin 1994; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a).  
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2.2 Cognitive Shortcuts or Heuristics 
Although “voters are not fools” (Key 1966, 7), they clearly lack the requisite 
political information required by traditional democratic theory (Bennett 1988; 
Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Neuman 1986). The opinion that a 
low level of knowledge leads to poor quality decisions has been challenged. Do 
people with little knowledge really make unqualified decisions? A lack of political 
information seriously inhibits voters’ ability to make informed or “correct” vote 
choices (Bartels 1996). Yet many citizens nevertheless do make informed voting 
decisions (Lau and Redlawsk 1997). 
Several political scholars in recent years have argued that people make 
comprehensive use of what little information they have because they replace factual 
information with cognitive shortcuts, or heuristics in political judgments. For example, 
voters may use heuristics or information shortcuts, such as following the position 
taken by a group or leader that the citizen believes has their interests at heart (Graber 
2001; Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Popkin 1994; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 
1991a; Zaller 1992). Yet this does not mean that they are not acting in a rational way. 
The cognitive literature suggests that individuals rely on different knowledge 
structures and cues, depending on their expertise. The individual differences captured 
 
 
 
44
by political sophistication are critical to political decision-making.  
This growing body of literature in political science is largely grounded in 
findings that citizens lack information about political affairs. As Converse (1990, 372) 
put it, “the two simplest truths I know about the distribution of political information in 
modern electorates are that the mean is low and variance high.” This line of work has 
its early roots in research on opinion-leadership, in which citizens who lacked 
political information relied on others to funnel information to them or to provide a cue 
for political judgments (Campbell et al. 1960; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1964; Key 1961). 
Since then, recent work by authors such as Popkin (1991), Sniderman, Brody, and 
Tetlock (1991a), and Lupia and McCubbins (1998) has looked more closely at how 
individuals deal with their paltry stores of knowledge.  
Recognizing the cognitive limitations of decision-making, the idea goes back 
to Simon’s pioneering work on “satisficing” and “bounded rationality” (1957a; 1957b; 
1997)17. Confronted with a decision-making problem people behave as “cognitive 
minimalists”, i.e. they try to limit the cognitive investment and they are satisfied with 
                                            
17 Speaking about rationality, it is necessary to specify further what it actually means. Among many 
existing definitions I will use here a very broad and minimal definition which is that a rational choice is 
a choice where people have reasons, irrespective of what these reasons might be (Lupia and 
McCubbins 2000a, 7). This does not imply that people are driven by benefit maximizing strategies to 
increase their economic wealth when making political choices. People’s ability to make constant 
calculations about the consequences of their actions are limited, and many other sources, such as (often 
altruistic) ideologies and ethical consideration may influence their decision to a large or even greater 
extent than benefit-maximizing thoughts. However it means “People usually have reasons for what 
they do” (Simon 1995, 45). They are able to justify with some arguments why they have reached a 
certain conclusion and why they have made a certain choice. 
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acceptable (not optimal) strategies. It drops the use of comprehensive decision rules, 
like the optimization of subjective utility, which may be applied to any and all 
circumstances. “Like comprehensive rationality, bounded rationality assumes that 
actors are goal-oriented, but bounded rationality takes into account the cognitive 
limitations of decision makers in attempting to achieve those goals” (Jones 1999, 299). 
Consider as well Gigerenzer’s and Selten’s (2001, 8) presentation: “models of 
bounded rationality consist of simple step-by-step rules that function well under the 
constraints of limited search, knowledge, and time--whether or not an optimal 
procedure is available.” In this view, people make decisions by applying heuristics to 
specific domains that are linked to more general building blocks. The rules are not 
“domain general as would be the case in subjective expected utility” (Gigerenzer 2001, 
38).18 Bounded rationality points to simple heuristics that guide people’s choices and 
behavior. 
Downs (1957) has already applied this insight to choice in representative 
democracies. He argued that citizens simplify their choice by using cognitive 
shortcuts and by delegating the search for information or even the decisions to other 
                                            
18 Klein (1998; 2001) and the other essays collected in Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) criticize those 
who rely only on the optimization of expected utility as the explanatory mechanism at the individual 
level. They argue on behalf of a set of alternatives, bounded rationality and “adaptive toolbox.” 
Furthermore, Klein (1998) provides evidence and analysis that denies Marcus, Neuman, and 
MacKuen’s (2000) claim that crises engender rational calculations and action. Instead in those 
circumstances, Klein argues, individuals usually narrow the set of choices and follow established 
procedures. 
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actors whom they trust and believe to be competent. As Downs (1957) argues, it is 
rational for voters not to seek information about candidates and issues; it follows that 
what little knowledge most people have about politics comes as a by-product of 
experiences encountered when they are not looking for political messages, rather than 
from specifically searching for political information (Page and Shapiro 1992, ch. 2).  
Popkin (1991, 49) suggests that cognitive shortcuts serve the needs of rational 
voters: “just as fire alarms alert the firefighters to fire, saving them the effort of 
patrolling to look for smoke, so do information shortcuts save voters the effort of 
constantly searching for relevant facts.” Popkin (1991, 212) argues that voters use 
shortcuts such as party identification and personal information about the candidates to 
reduce their uncertainly about the candidates; he calls this mode of reasoning “low-
information rationality, or gut reasoning.” Popkin (1994) finds that there is a low 
information rationality and people have a very practical way of thinking about 
government. They combine information from past experiences, validate and 
incorporate information in conversation with other people, and finally come to 
conclusions based on information from various sources of direct or indirect 
information (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; 2000a; McKelvey and 
Ordeshook 1986; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a). 
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 Voters apparently do not need to be fully informed about politics to choose a 
candidate or participate in a campaign. Voters do not need to have “encyclopedic” 
knowledge about politics in order to make reasoned choices (Lupia and McCubbins 
2000b)19 Summary information about candidates abounds and suffices to instruct 
voters about candidates’ issue positions and policy preferences.20 Although these 
decisions are not as well informed as classical democratic theory requires, scholars 
have found that citizens make wide-ranging use of information shortcuts, cues, or 
heuristics to make “second-best” decisions or the same decisions had they had 
complete information (Mondak 1993a; Popkin 1994).  
For example, a person can buy a technologically complicated product, such as 
a computer, without knowing anything about how it works. She puts her trust in 
choosing a product from a reliable company. Bowler and Donovan (1998, 30) use a 
very effective analogy to illustrate the difference between the old and the new look in 
public opinion research: “Voters, to use an analogy, may know very little about the 
workings of the internal combustion engine, but they do know how to drive. And 
                                            
19 Lupia and McCubbins define a “reasoned choice” as one in which an individual knows the 
consequences of their action (2000b, 47-8). 
20 There are various ways information is presented to voters in a summarized way. The most common 
sources of cues are political parties, endorsers and incumbency status. All of these factors are shortcuts 
that provide evidence of how a candidate has performed in the past and many position him/herself in 
the future. In other words, knowing a candidate’s political party, endorsers and incumbency status may 
suffice to instruct voters because it provides signals of a candidate’s views on issues and policies. 
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while we might say that early voting studies focused on voter ignorance of the engine, 
these newer studies pay more attention to the ability to drive.” 
In the same way, voters make use of political parties or ideologies as 
“trademarks.” Being uninformed is thus not entirely the same as making an irrational 
choice (Niemi and Weisberg 2001, 105-6). For another example, voters faced with the 
task of voting on ballot propositions may use credible sources of information such as 
an elite endorsement as a guide to making a reasoned judgment (Lupia 1994). 
Similarly, voters in congressional elections often rely on party identification or name 
recognition to help them navigate the waters of political judgment. 
The optimism is understandable because it offers evidence of how to solve the 
democratic dilemma and this research can give valuable insight as to how people 
possibly deal with information shortfalls. However, there are several question marks 
about this theory. First, there is a lack of empirical evidence. Most of the empirical 
studies are experimental studies in which citizens are exposed to different kinds of 
information and they are offered various shortcuts to make up their minds instead of 
direct issue-related information. These studies then show that voters can fill the 
information shortfall by using different cues and heuristics, and that people can come 
to similar conclusions by using heuristics.  
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However, this might not be a reflection of the real world. Perhaps both 
information and shortcuts are lacking. It remains unclear how often citizens replace 
information with shortcuts and cues taking into account that both are costly and 
require some effort. The use of heuristics and cues might require even more political 
knowledge than having knowledge specific to party or candidate. The above argument 
assumes that people use shortcuts as a replacement for primary information. But it 
could be the case that there is a positive linear relationship between the amount of 
information people have and the shortcuts they use. In fact, it is likely that people 
with a lot of substantive knowledge make use of several cues and shortcuts as well to 
validate their information and come to a better conclusion.  
The second problem is that using shortcuts and cues in a comprehensive way 
requires institutional and political knowledge. Voters can use party positions or media 
opinion only when they trust these opinions, and they only trust them if they have a 
previous record about the parties or media positions. It is impossible to use shortcuts 
and cues if there is no previous record of where parties and leaders stand and how 
political institutions work. But Delli Carpini, and Keeter (1996) show that people lack 
this kind of knowledge to a great extent, too. In addition, if people use shortcuts and 
cues, they do not do so in a strategic way but automatically do so without major 
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reasoning.  
Information shortcuts are nonetheless information (Luskin 2002). Voters still 
need to know something about politics for informational shortcuts to be effective. 
Almost all accounts of the use of political cues agree that voters should be able to 
identify the candidates, either through their names or party affiliation, know whether a 
candidate is an incumbent or a challenger, who endorses that candidate, and what the 
different parties stand for. The literature appears to agree that there are minimal 
informational requirements for voting.21   
Consequently, the heuristics available to voters are limited by their level of 
political sophistication. The ability of voters to use heuristics is thus also limited by 
their level of political knowledge -- specifically, their ability to associate political 
objects with other salient referents. While there is considerable debate in the literature 
over whether heuristic reasoning is able to compensate for the public’s overall lack of 
knowledge about politics, it appears that most voters can do better than push buttons 
or mark circles at random in the voting booth.22 
                                            
21 Obviously, those who know more than the minimal levels of information are always better off. 
Bartels argues that fully informed voters act differently from other voters (Bartels 1993). In addition, 
better-informed voters tend to vote more moderately than less informed voters (Luskin, Fishkin, and 
Jowell 2002) and are less hesitant about candidates’ policy positions (Alvarez and Brehm 2002). 
22 Although heuristics often inform, they may also misinform. A female candidate running for office 
will likely be perceived as more liberal than a male opponent since voters believe women, generally 
speaking, are more liberal than men (McDermott 1997). This cue may be accurate much of the time, 
but it surely fails on occasion. The cure for such information failures, of course, is more information. 
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Finally, cognitive heuristics do not explain why more knowledgeable or 
sophisticated individuals behave differently than their less knowledgeable 
counterparts (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). In effect, better-informed citizens are 
significantly more likely to participate in politics, are better able to link their self-
interests to specific opinions about the political world, are more likely to have stable 
and internally consistent opinions over time, and have a greater chance of 
coordinating their opinions with political participation in a meaningful and rational 
way (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Furthermore, as Lau and Redlawsk (2001a), 
Kuklinski and Quirk (2000), and Bartels (1996) indicate, to show that information 
shortcuts allow uninformed voters to act as if they were fully informed is not easy.  
In conclusion, while the American electorate is not particularly well informed, 
voters possess enough political savvy adequately to perform their civic responsibility. 
Utilizing theories of bounded rationality and heuristic shortcuts, these perspectives 
suggest that citizens are able to adequately fill in the gaps in their political 
understanding and make decisions that are both informed and rational (Lodge, 
Steenbergen, and Brau 1995; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1994). These 
scholars suggest that citizens need not be experts about politics to participate; rather, 
the decisions they are asked to make are widely salient and information is readily 
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available, meaning they are able to act competently.  
 
2.3 Party Identification as a Heuristic  
E.E. Schattschneider once observed, “modern democracy is unthinkable save 
in terms of parties” (Schattschneider 1942, 1). When electoral competition is 
organized by parties, party identification can benefit both established parties and 
voters (Aldrich 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996). Voters can simplify their decision 
making by identifying a party that has reliably served their interests in the past and 
using it as a guide to political judgment. In other words, party identification is a 
stance that people take toward political parties. The concept of party identification has 
been central to our understanding of electoral behavior (Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 
1960; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; 
Miller and Shanks 1996).  
Party identification is one potential heuristic aid.23 Researchers describe 
partisanship as a heuristic for organizing political information, evaluations, and 
behaviors. The cue-giving function of partisanship is strongest for voting behavior, 
                                            
23 There are a number of heuristic shortcuts that may play a role in voting behavior. It is understood 
that there are several heuristic shortcuts, such as the “party identification heuristic,” the “status quo 
heuristic” (Bowler and Donovan 1998), the “trust heuristic,” the “duty heuristic” (Scholz and Pinney 
1995), the “likeability heuristic” (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a), the “accessibility heuristic” 
(Iyengar and Kinder 1987) or “interpersonal heuristics” (Popkin 1993).  
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because citizens make explicit partisan choices. Popkin and Dimock (1999, 142) state, 
“many citizens with little or no understanding of the institutions of government do 
hold partisan identification and do identify with individual characters on the political 
scene.” Moreover, party attachments are relevant to a much broader range of political 
phenomena than social group cues or other heuristics, because parties are so central to 
the political process. Issues and events frequently are presented to the public in 
partisan terms, and nearly all politicians are affiliated with a political party. In this 
context, the most reliable and “cheapest cue” available to voters is a candidate’s party 
affiliation (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1990; Rahn 1993).24  
Thus, in the United States at least, party labels help individuals predict the 
issue positions of political candidates, determine and organize their own issue 
positions, and “correctly” select political leaders without possessing “encyclopedic” 
levels of information (Downs 1957; Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Lau and Redlawsk 2001a; 
Lodge and Hamill 1986; Popkin 1994; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a). In fact, 
Rahn (1993, 473) states:  
 
                                            
24 This does not mean that party identification is a perfect cue. In fact, the issue of abortion shows that 
this is not the case. Many Republicans are pro-choice, as some Democrats are pro-life. Nevertheless, in 
the absence of other information, party identification is normally quite reliable. Rahn (1993) notes, 
even when candidates’ positions are inconsistent with that of the party, citizens ignore the conflicting 
information and still rely on party as a cue. 
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In partisan elections, the most powerful cue provided by the political 
environment is the candidate’s membership in a particular political party. Even 
if voters know nothing else about a candidate, the ballot provides them with one 
important piece of information. The cue provided by the party label is simple, 
direct, and … consequential in shaping individuals’ perceptions and evaluations 
of political candidates. 
 
Most modern research in the field of voting behavior has been organized 
around three schools of thought about how voters arrive at their decisions. Given the 
concept’s intellectual history, I will present the relevant theoretical sources beginning 
with the Columbia school, proceeding to the Michigan school, and concluding with 
the response of rational choice theory. After that, I will explore the relationship 
between political sophistication and party identification. 
 
2.3.1 Traditional Theoretical Studies of Party Identification25 
The Sociological Model 
The first major theory of voting behavior—advanced by Berelson, Lazarsfeld 
and McPhee (1954)—emphasizes the role of social structures as determinants of 
voting behavior. This approach, often called the “Columbia” model of voting, posits 
that voting decisions are based on “relating voters’ socioeconomic status (education, 
                                            
25 I use the terms “partisanship,” “party attachment,” “party closeness,” and “party identification” 
interchangeably and understand them to mean some underlying affinity for a political party felt by a 
voter. 
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income, and class), religion, and place of residence (urban or rural) to their vote” 
(Niemi and Weisberg 2001, 8). The Columbia model essentially argues for a 
“stimulus-response” concept of voting; the same stimulus should always produce the 
same response in the voter, regardless of changes in the voter’s immediate 
environment.  
The Columbia approach argues that voters make evaluations based primarily 
on their socioeconomic status; it is almost as if voters are wired by their socialization 
processes to respond to particular political stimuli in certain, specific ways. In 
particular, it argues for strong influence by members of relevant social groups, such as 
peers and relatives, on voting behavior.  
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady call the relationship between “socioeconomic 
status -- levels of education, income, and occupation -- and citizen activity” a 
relationship “with long pedigrees in social science analysis … with a firm empirical 
footing through the decades and across politics, but with a less compelling theoretical 
grounding” (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 4-5). Sociological factors include 
but are not limited to education, income, and occupation. According to this model, 
citizen activity in both politics and society correlates with socioeconomic status 
variables; that is, people with higher education, income, and vocation status tend to 
 
 
 
56
participate more frequently (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Conway 2000; Lijphart 1997; 
Ragsdale and Rusk 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Verba et al. 1993; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  
 
The Socio-Psychological Model 
An alternative model was advanced by Campbell et al. (1960), working from 
national voting studies conducted at the Survey Research Center at the University of 
Michigan. This approach posits a socio-psychological framework in which vote 
choice is not simply a function of sociological factors. Instead, the Michigan school 
argued, voters integrated new political stimuli from their environment into their 
decision-making process, augmenting their socialization with some internal 
processing of new information.  
Campbell et al. (1960) laid out one of the most important treatises on the 
centrality of parties in political decision-making, arguing that party identifications are 
psychological attachments that shape political attitudes and evaluations and help 
individuals to establish coherent sets of political opinions (Campbell et al. 1960, 128-
36). The authors of The American Voter characterized the party as “a supplier of cues 
by which the individual may evaluate the elements of politics” (Campbell et al. 1960, 
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128) and described partisanship as a “perceptual screen” through which individuals 
interpret and evaluate political experiences. Thus, the common party identification 
scale used in the United States was defined by Campbell et al. (1960) as a measure of 
a citizen’s “affective orientation” toward the two major parties. 
This theoretical school expects persistent adherence to a particular party; 
conversions are infrequent (Campbell et al. 1960, 162; Miller and Shanks 1996, 120). 
Campbell et al. (1960; 1966) take party identification as an immediate determinant 
which has a direct and significant influence on voters’ decisions. In their social-
psychological model, party identification is considered to be the single most important 
determinant of vote choice.  
According to Campbell et al., party identification is a psychological 
attachment adopted at an early age, primarily from one’s parents, without any specific 
knowledge of issues or parties’ issue positions.26 Indeed, the developers of the 
concept stressed its functional importance: 
 
                                            
26 Converse (1969, 148) formalized the argument, proposing a model with four elements: 1) a learning 
process, the basic increments in partisan loyalties shown by the individuals over their life cycles as a 
direct function of their continuing experience with the party system; 2) a resistance phenomenon, 
representing the declining ease of learning as a function of the absolute age at which individuals 
commence their experience within the system; 3) a transmission process, capturing whatever 
vicissitudes may surround the transfer of partisan feeling from one generation to the next, and 4) a 
forgetting process, handling the rate of decay in retention of partisan loyalties subsequent to any 
suspension of democratic process, eliminating the mass relevance of traditional parties. The most 
important elements are the learning and transmission processes. 
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The present analysis of party identification is based on the assumption that the 
… parties serve as standard-setting groups for a significant proportion of the 
people in the country. In other words, it is assumed that many people associate 
themselves psychologically with one or the other of the parties, and that this 
identification has predictable relationship with their perceptions, evaluation, 
and actions (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1971, 90). 
 
Consider some exemplary statements: At any one election, Converse and 
Pierce (1986, 96-7) maintain, “We expect to find a rather clear positive correlation 
between age and the strength of party identification.” Miller and Shanks specify the 
relationship between age and habituation: “For most young adults (ages 26-29) there 
is much less malleability after the third election experience” (1996, 130-1). In 
countries with established histories of democratic elections, age and electoral 
experience go together; where elections are new, age is not a surrogate for exposure to 
elections. Also, “There is evidence of a kind of ‘settling down’ or habituation to a 
competitive party system, which occurs at a mass level as a secular trend over time” 
(Converse 1969, 141). In this perspective, party identification is a persistent loyalty to 
a political party. 
The authors hold that voting is the only political activity for most people, and 
that voters do not behave rationally because they are significantly influenced by 
almost blind allegiance to party identification. In addition, they note that a voter’s 
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socioeconomic status has a significant relationship to his or her level of political 
interests. Those who show a high degree of political interest have a correspondingly 
high socio-economic status, while those who have a low degree of interest have a low 
socio-economic status.  
Converse (1969), in his extension of The American Voter model, employs the 
concept of a “normal vote” to explain changing electoral results and their meanings 
by providing a baseline for American electoral divisions. While taking party 
identification as the prevailing long-term force, Converse underlines elections in 
which many voters defect to the other party because of such short-term forces as 
candidates’ personalities, and voters’ issue orientations. Yet it should be noted that 
what Converse calls short-term forces are not necessarily consistent positions of 
voters.  
 
The Rational Choice Model 
A third approach, advanced initially by Downs (1957)27, argues that voters 
make decisions based on “rational choice.”28 The essence of rational choice theory is 
                                            
27 Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) marks the first application of rational choice 
theory to the study of political behavior. The debates between the behavioralists and the rationalists 
have conditioned the study of political behavior for half a century. Both groups pushed aside a third 
rival, the Columbia school, which emphasized the social context of political behavior. See Huckfeldt 
and Sprague (1995) for a recent full elaboration. 
28 Downs (1957, 4-20) uses a narrow definition of rationality that allows for possible errors of rational 
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that individuals are motivated by self-interest and that they seek to maximize their 
utility.29 Nevertheless, to maximize the utility of a given decision, an individual needs 
to have a certain amount of information at hand. Rational choice theory’s 
conceptualization substitutes reasoned decisions for the emotional and affective 
elements included by the Michigan school.  
Given that individuals do not always have a clear notion of what they want as 
an outcome, of how the alternatives relate to such an outcome, or how the different 
outcomes relate to their own interests, Downs assumed that citizens do not make their 
political decisions under conditions of perfect information. Rather, they live in a 
world of uncertainty where they need to search for information before coming to a 
decision, because information gathering is a costly action. The problem of imperfect 
information then implies that often citizens are uncertain about their political 
decisions. In its place, party preference is the result of people’s reasoned calculations, 
                                                                                                                             
men, imperfection of political rationality, and inefficiency of political systems. Downs does not deal 
with “the whole personality of each individual” when the rationality of this individual matters. That is, 
Downs’ model takes into account a narrowly defined rationality, involving only the economic and 
political goals of each individual or group. Downs’ conception is supported by many empirical studies 
in the 1970s and the 1980s that emphasize the substantial increase in the number of sophisticated voters 
(Nie and Andersen 1974; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976). 
29 In Downs’ initial formulation, the act of voting in and of itself was seen as irrational. Regarding 
political participation, because the net gain in participation is relatively small compared to the cost of 
participation, the theory argues that citizens will not participate and simply catch a “free-ride” from 
those who do participate (Olson 1965). Attempts to reconcile this “paradox of voting” have had 
decidedly mixed results, see e.g. Ricker and Ordeshook (1968), Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), Cyr 
(1975), Katosh and Traugott (1982), Sigelman and Berry (1982), and Fiorina (1990). More recently, 
Bendor, Diermeier and Ting (2003) attempt to resolve the paradox by fusing rational choice and 
psychological explanations. 
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which view the parties as alternatives in a choice set and which link the selection to 
variations in policy preferences and perceptions of self-interest (Achen 1992; Downs 
1957; Fiorina 1981; Key 1966; Kiewiet 1983).  
Under these conditions, parties’ ideologies appear as information shortcuts for 
voters who cannot judge politics expertly. Citizens vote for the party that is perceived 
closer to their ideal position on the left-right dimension. Given the lack of perfect 
information for the electorate, Downs conceived ideology as an information saving 
device. That is, it is a perceptual cue that helps ordinary citizens to have a general idea 
about policy positions of the main parties of their political system. In this view, 
partisan identification is a choice to prefer one party selected from a set of alternative 
political parties.  
Challenging the social-psychological school’s model, Key (1966, 7-8) 
contends that voters are not ignorant and are able to consider “central and relevant 
questions of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive 
personality.” Key (1966, 64-71) downplays voters’ psychological identification with 
political parties and points out that party switchers cross party lines in accordance 
with their policy preferences. Key notes that voters are issue-oriented, politically 
sophisticated, and rational enough to analyze available information. Key’s position is 
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largely consistent with Downs’ (1957) rational choice perspective, which emphasizes 
an atomized individual voter who is considered to have a high degree of political 
interest and who behaves with a rational orientation or political ideology while being 
independent from social organizations and/or political parties.  
Adopting Downs’ perspective on rationality, Fiorina (1981) also assumes a 
critical position toward the social-psychological school’s views on party identification 
and voters’ rationality. Fiorina (1981, 198-9) holds that “past predispositions do not 
completely overcome the face of reality,” and maintains that there are always 
“predictable changes in party identification” since voters’ past predispositions are 
challenged by their perception of a changing reality. Fiorina (1981, 83) offers “a 
model of the individual voting decision that depends on the notion that citizens 
monitor party promises and past performances over time, and encapsulate their 
observations in a summary judgment termed ‘party identification’.”30 However, 
Achen (1992) modifies this claim. He accepts that citizens evaluate the past behavior 
                                            
30 Empirical studies suggest that voters do so by engaging in retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981; Key 
1966; Kramer 1971) -- that is, by evaluating candidates and parties based on their past performance, 
rather than evaluating them prospectively based on their promises of future behavior. Much of the 
literature on this question has focused on economic voting, a form of retrospective voting that focuses 
on the performance of the economy under the stewardship of a particular candidate or party (Lewis-
Beck 1988). However, the ability of voters to engage in any form of retrospective voting is necessarily 
limited by their ability to attribute blame or credit to a particular party or candidate. Duch, Palmer and 
Anderson (2000) find that politically sophisticated voters’ retrospective and prospective evaluations of 
the American national economy are strongly affected by their partisan preferences, thus producing a 
systematic bias in individual-level measures of economic voting, while Gomez and Wilson (2001) find 
that less sophisticated American voters attribute credit and blame for macroeconomic conditions to the 
president, while more sophisticated voters do not, as they recognize the president’s relative lack of 
control over the economy. 
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of the parties. They do so, he maintains, as they evaluate prospective benefits to be 
obtained from the political parties. This approach to partisanship insists that citizens 
view the parties as variable alternatives. 
Like members of the Michigan school, rational choice theorists expect 
relatively stable partisan attachments. Indeed, Fiorina cites approvingly Key’s 
metaphor, “standing decision,” an image that reflects persistent concerns and 
associated political judgments. Switching from party to party, however, is systematic 
and not uncommon. What accounts for changes in partisan preferences? When 
individuals alter their views of the benefits of the relationship between their policy 
preferences and the political parties, they change their partisan preferences (Fiorina 
1981, 410-1). More recent refinements of rational choice theory (Althaus 1998; 
Enelow and Hinich 1984) have suggested that voters use the difference between their 
position on the issues and the perceived positions of candidates (“issue distance”) as a 
measure of how various outcomes will affect them, even when they possess limited 
information. Each framework offers a valuable contribution to understanding voting 
decisions.  
In sum, partisanship is thought of as a political guide (Miller 1976; Wattenberg 
and Wattenberg 1996, ch. 2). Regardless of whether scholars perceive party 
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identification as a psychological attachment (Campbell et al. 1960), a social identity 
(Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), or a running tally of past evaluations (Fiorina 
1981), all agree that party loyalties condition political opinions and behavior within 
the U.S. (Fiorina 2002) and other countries (Dalton 2006; Green, Palmquist, and 
Schickler 2002). Studies of party identification offer some of the best scholarship in 
political science. The analyses apply to newly forming as well as established 
democracies, and they address dynamic patterns as well as single points in times.  
 
2.3.2 Empirical Studies of Political Sophistication and the Partisan Heuristic 
Much literature has focused on the influence of party identification on voter 
decision making. Specifically, the relationship between sophistication and 
partisanship is at the center of the sophistication debate. Parties can act as a heuristic 
device for people at all different levels of political knowledge and interest, and can 
play an important role in the processing of political information (Rahn 1993). The 
reason for the importance of party in voting models is simple: parties lower the costs 
of voting by providing citizens with fairly reliable cues. Party identification may be 
thought of as “a relatively cheap cognitive cue, but its maintenance costs are not nil” 
(Martinez 1990, 824).  
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Therefore, partisanship has often been associated with low levels of political 
sophistication (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Kahn and Kenney 1997; Lau and 
Redlawsk 1997; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986). In this view, relying on party cues 
is a simplistic way to make decisions about politics. Campbell et al. (1960) argue that 
reliance solely on party cues makes it impossible to keep abreast of any change in 
party stance that might bring the party farther from the individual’s particular ideology. 
In this sense, the person blindly using party cues is not using his own general ideology 
or theory to monitor the appropriateness of the party affiliation shortcut. 
Downs (1957) posits party labels as an elite-provided cue to overcome voters’ 
incentives for rational ignorance. Building on this perspective, Shively (1979) poses 
the “decision function” hypothesis: The fewer “resources” a voter possesses to “pay 
the costs” of information needed to make an electoral choice, the more likely she is to 
acquire a party identification. Recent research reaffirms voters’ reliance on 
judgmental shortcuts; for example, voters can infer attitudes toward new policies 
according to where fellow partisans stand (Popkin 1994; Sniderman, Brody, and 
Tetlock 1991b). If partisanship works as a decision-making crutch for those who lack 
information, then we expect informationally-handicapped voters to depend on it most.  
Rational choice theorists argue that the primary reason that parties exist in all 
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modern democracies is to mobilize low-information voters (Downs 1957; Popkin 
1994). From this perspective, the most partisan of voters should be individuals who 
know the least about key political actors and whose day-to-day activities provide 
insufficient information to allow them to begin to carefully evaluate individual 
candidates and policy positions on a case-by-case basis. As Shively (1979) argues, it 
is much more “expensive” for poorly informed voters, both in terms of time and “the 
strain that comes with dealing with specific bits of information,” to acquire the 
information needed to cast an informed vote, and thus these voters are more inclined 
to turn to the “informational shortcuts” that parties provide (Shively 1979, 1040-1). 
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991a) suggest that there is an interaction 
between political sophistication and decision rules such that less politically 
sophisticated voters tend to rely on heuristics as they construct their political 
judgments. They suggest that, in particular, the less-sophisticated may rely on an 
affective (or “likeability”) heuristic. Lupia and McCubbins (1998) also examine 
political reasoning in the face of low information. They argue that citizens can be 
persuaded by credible endorsements on issues. They show that people tend to follow 
those source cues that they find credible, and they are repelled by those source cues 
that they find untrustworthy. Their main point is “people are selective about whom 
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they choose to believe” (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, 184). 
However, decades of empirical research point in the opposition direction that 
voters with higher levels of political knowledge also have higher levels of 
partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Miller and Shanks 1996; Palfrey 
and Poole 1987; Zaller 1991). These findings suggest that party identification emerges 
as a product of rational information-seeking, rather than as a solution to rational 
ignorance. Although sophisticated voters expose themselves more frequently to 
information that could change their preferences, the repository of prior information 
that under girds their predispositions is many times larger than among the less 
informed (Converse 1962; Fiorina 1981; Zaller 1992). Voters who are interested in 
politics also acquire information more readily (Fiorina 1990).   
There is also a tremendous amount of evidence from the advanced industrial 
democracies pointing to a powerful and positive relationship between political 
sophistication and partisanship: studies have consistently found that better-informed 
citizens are not only typically more partisan (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; 
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), but also they are more tolerant, exhibit higher levels 
of external political efficacy, possess lower levels of political cynicism, vote at higher 
rates, and are more likely to become involved in non-electoral forms of political 
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participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). The limited empirical research that has 
been undertaken in emerging democracies finds a positive relationship between 
political sophistication, as seen in the results from survey-based studies of the Russian 
electorate and partisanship (Brader and Tucker 2001; Colton 2000). 
If we consider that both sophisticated and non-sophisticated people may 
indeed use partisanship as a heuristic for other political decisions (DeSart 1995), it 
becomes difficult to observe a difference between sophisticated and non-sophisticated 
voters in terms of the use of political party cues. Since many researchers argue that 
reliance on partisanship is indicative of a non-sophisticated voter, recognizing that the 
sophisticated voter may also use party cues blurs the line between the two groups. 
Perhaps this point helps to explain the disagreement in the literature as to whether 
party-switchers and ticket-splitters are sophisticated or unsophisticated (Campbell et 
al. 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). Consequently, it is very possible 
that partisanship can be the tool of the sophisticated and the unsophisticated alike. 
With this background in place, it is quite difficult to discern whether party cues 
belong typically to the less sophisticated or the more sophisticated.  
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2.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed the relevant literature on political conceptualization, 
political sophistication, and heuristics. Since political scientists have recognized 
political sophistication as the cornerstone of effective democratic participation, they 
have been concerned with identifying how well voters understand politics. Levels of 
political sophistication are very low. Empirical evidence shows that the public has a 
low level of political sophistication. Many citizens don’t even possess basic 
knowledge about the functioning of the government. Democracy with many badly-
informed citizens is dysfunctional because the interests of many citizens are not 
reflected or are underrepresented in the decision making process. 
However, many studies show that poorly-sophisticated citizens do vote 
correctly. The critical question is how ordinary citizens are able to make a reasonable 
choice in elections with low levels of political sophistication. The possible answer is 
that people replace factual information with shortcuts or heuristic cues to compensate 
for their lack of information or knowledge. By specifically focusing on shortcuts and 
heuristics some scholars assume that a negative relationship exists between 
sophistication and the use of heuristics because less sophisticated citizens are more 
likely to use heuristics than more sophisticated citizens. 
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Referring to these studies, I reviewed the relationship between political 
sophistication and the use of partisan cues. The relationship between sophistication 
and partisan cues is at the center of the sophistication debate. Scholars think of 
partisanship as a heuristic for organizing political information, evaluations, and 
behaviors. This cue-giving function of partisanship is strongest for voting behavior, 
because citizens make explicit partisan choices when they vote. Moreover, scholars 
have found that party cues help citizens predict the issue positions of candidates and 
place them on an ideological spectrum.  
Partisanship is often associated with low levels of political sophistication. 
Though this idea is good in theory, it is not supported by empirical analyses. If we 
consider that both sophisticated and non-sophisticated people may use partisanship as 
a heuristic, however, it becomes difficult to observe a difference between 
sophisticated and non-sophisticated voters in terms of the use of political party cues. 
Some scholars have argued that voters with higher levels of political sophistication 
also have higher levels of partisanship. Thus, it is possible that partisanship can be the 
tool of the sophisticated and the unsophisticated alike.  
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Chapter III. Data and Methodology 
 
This chapter focuses on my measurement strategies and data. Translating any 
theoretical concept into empirical measures is difficult. But doing so with my seven 
measures of political sophistication is particularly complicated because each has been 
measured in previous work with different strategies and data sets.  
Using the logit regression models described in the following, I explore the 
relationship between the level of political sophistication and the use of partisan cues 
in the 2002 Korean presidential election. Next, this study seeks to discover how levels 
of political sophistication affect voter turnout. Finally, I compare the separate effects 
of political sophistication on the voter choice model. The dependent variables in my 
statistical models are party identification, voter turnout, and presidential vote choice. 
The primary independent variable is political sophistication. All statistical analyses 
were conducted using the STATA 8.2 software package. 
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3.1 Data and Statistics 
My data come from a post-election survey of the 2002 Korean presidential 
election (“The 16th Korean Presidential Election Study”) conducted by the Korean 
Social Science Data Center (KSDC). It was conducted between 20 December and 27 
December 2002, immediately after the election (See Table 2). In the survey, citizens 
are asked about their participation in the vote and their voting choices, as well as a 
number of standard social-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, 
level of income, place of origin, and occupation. 
 
Table 2: Dates of, and Voter Turnout in, National Elections in Korea since 1987 
 Presidential Election National Assembly Election31 
1 December 16, 1987/ 89.2  
2  April 26, 1988/ 75.8 
3  March 24, 1992/ 71.9 
4 December 18, 1992/ 81.9  
5  April 11, 1996/ 63.9 
6 December 18, 1997/ 80.7  
7  April 13, 2000/ 57.2 
8 December 19, 2002/ 70.8  
9  April 14, 2004/ 60.6 
Note: Bolded election is under investigation. 
Source: National Election Commission Homepage (www.nec.go.kr). 
                                            
31 In 1987 Korea adopted a full-fledged democratic system. In this system, presidential elections and 
congressional elections are irregularly staggered. The single-term president is elected by a direct 
popular vote every five years starting December 1987. The last presidential election was held in 
December 2002 when the current President Roh Moo-hyun was elected. On the other hand, 
congressional elections are held every four years starting April 1988. The term limit for the President 
was adopted to prevent any long-lasting dictatorships. 
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The data were gathered by telephone interviews with 1,500 random voters 
chosen in a stratified, multi-stage probability design. In the first stage, each province 
(except Cheju province, the smallest province and an island) was allocated a number 
of observations proportional to its population of 20 years and older in the 1995 census. 
In the second stage, numbers were allocated to reflect the age distribution in each 
province. Male and female voters were selected in equal numbers in all provinces. In 
the third stage, based on the target number of observations for each province, a 
random sample of election districts was chosen. For each election district, two voting 
places were randomly selected, and in each voting place 15 voters were chosen. This 
data represents the most comprehensive post-election data available on Korean 
presidential elections. 
My statistical analyses rely on a series of logit regression models predicting 
party identification, voter turnout, and candidate choice, because these dependent 
variables are dichotomous. All models include a range of standard socio-demographic 
variables such as gender, age, education, income, residential areas, origin or region, 
ideology, and political sophistication. All variables are drawn from theories of party 
identification and political behavior in established democracies. 
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In social science, binary dependent variables are commonly used (Kilwein and 
Brisbin 1997; Krain 1997; Poirier 1994; Swers 1998). Common examples of these in 
logit models include workers choosing whether to join workers’ unions, married 
women deciding whether to work, or voters deciding whether to vote. Since there are 
only two choices in the dependent variable, one is unable to use regular regression 
analysis because it may cause a problem for estimating coefficients. For instance, the 
regression line may yield a negative probability for extremely low values of 
independent variables. For extremely high values of independent variables the 
regression line may indicate a probability much higher than one. Outcomes of lower 
than zero or higher than one are not feasible because there are only two values (zero 
and one) of the dependent variable. 
Logit is the natural log of the odds. While using logistic errors produces the 
logit model, using normal errors produces the probit model. The choice between logit 
and probit is a personal preference. “These two functions [logit and probit] are very 
similar and in today’s software environment, the choice between them is a matter of 
taste because both are so easy to estimate” (Kennedy 1998, 234). Since the dependent 
variables of this dissertation, party identification, voter turnout, and presidential vote 
choice have all two categories, the logit model is used to analyze the outcome variable 
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in terms of several covariates.  
Interpreting logit regression is more complicated than interpreting standard 
ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. Unlike OLS regression, logit regression does 
not assume a linear relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable, does not require normally distributed variables, and also does not assume 
homoscedasticity. Logit regression applies maximum likelihood estimation after 
transforming the dependent into a logit variable. Therefore, to estimate the probability 
of a certain event occurring, logit regression calculates changes in the log odds of the 
dependent variable, not changes in the dependent variable itself as OLS regression 
does. 
The success of a logit regression can be assessed by looking at the 
classification table, showing correct and incorrect classifications of the dichotomous 
dependent variable. Also, goodness-of-fit tests, such as model chi-square, are 
available as indicators of model appropriateness, as is the Wald statistic to test the 
significance of individual independent variables. To interpret the results of my logit 
regression analyses, I will examine the fit of each model. In addition to examining the 
goodness-of-fit statistics for the models, I can present psedo-R2 scores. But I still need 
to look closely at the coefficients of the variables included in the models, their level of 
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significance, and the corresponding Wald statistics.  
I include all coefficients, their standard errors, level of significance, and the 
Wald statistics in the tables presented in the next chapter. As Gary King suggests, 
when we share our research findings, we should report all coefficients of our 
explanatory variables, even the level at which these coefficients are conventionally 
not considered significant. Since many scholars often delete a coefficient which is 
above a significance level, King’s recommendation actually is to:  
 
Present the marginal probability level (the exact “level of significance”) for 
each coefficient, regardless of what it is; the author can argue whatever he or 
she wants and readers would still be able to draw their own conclusions. 
Statistical significance and substantive importance have no necessary 
relationship (King 1986, 684).  
 
It should also be noted that the coefficients shown in all the tables in this 
chapter are logit coefficients. Logit coefficients, also called unstandardized logit 
regression coefficients or effect coefficients, correspond to the unstandardized 
regression coefficients in ordinary least squares regression. But logits are the natural 
log of the odds. They are used in the logit regression equation to estimate or predict 
the log odds that the dependent equal 1 (binominal logit regression) or that the 
dependent variable equals its highest/last value (multinomial logit regression). For the 
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dichotomous case, if the logit for a given independent variable is b1 change in the log 
odds of the dependent variable (the natural log of the probability that the dependent = 
1divided by the probability that the dependent = 0).  
A key concept for understanding the tests used in logit regression is that of log 
likelihood. Likelihood means probability under a specified set of variables. The result 
is nearly always a small number, and to make it easier to handler, we take its natural 
logarithm, i.e. its log base e, giving us a log likelihood. Probabilities are always less 
than one, so log likelihood is always negative.  
 
3.2 The Dependent Variables 
To address my research questions I created three dependent variables: party 
identification, voter turnout, and candidate choice in the 2002 presidential election. 
With regard to party identification, the literature suggests that party identification is 
related to political sophistication (Harvey and Harvey 1970; Neuman 1981). Like 
conventional approaches in established democracies (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; 
Johnston 1992), I use self-reported party identification as my measure of partisanship. 
I assume the following: (1) if an individual feels extremely positive toward the party, 
she will be more likely to use the party cue informing her preference and increasing 
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her certainty over the issue and candidates, (2) if an individual feels extremely 
negative toward a party, he will be more likely to reject the given party’s position on 
an issue and a candidate, making him/her more certain in his response, and (3) 
individuals who are neutral toward the party are unlikely to find the cue very useful in 
reducing uncertainty in their political opinions. With regard to party identification, 
respondents answered the following: “Do you think of yourself as a supporter of any 
political party?” Thus, I have regrouped the responses to this question into the two 
political camps: partisan, and nonpartisan. A party identifier is someone who says they 
support a party. I assign nonpartisans a value of 0, and partisans a value of 1. In all, 
40.5 percent of respondents are classified as non-partisans. 
The second dependent variable is voter turnout, which I code 0 for 
respondents who reported not voting, and 1 for respondents who reported voted. 
There are many empirical studies that articulate that political sophistication is closely 
related to political participation and turnout (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Milbrath 1965; 
Palfrey and Poole 1987). According to traditional arguments, political sophistication 
increases the stability of political attitudes, allows for distinctive party preferences, 
and therefore increases the probability of voting. Furthermore, well informed 
respondents feel not only more competent to vote but are also more likely to have 
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positive evaluations of the democratic process, which also might mobilize them to 
vote (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell, Gurin, 
and Miller 1971; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gidengil 2004; Rahn, Aldrich, and 
Borgida 1994). 
The third dependent variable, candidate choice, represents who each 
respondent voted for in the 2002 presidential election. Respondents were asked 
immediately following the election which way they voted. I assign a value of 0 to 
voters who voted for an opposition party candidate, and a value of 1 to voters who 
voted for the governing Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) candidate, the current 
Korean president Roh Moo-hyun.  
Generally, the Korean electorate has shown coherent support for either the 
candidate of the ruling party or one or two candidates from the major opposition 
parties, regardless of the number of candidates from different parties. For instance, 
until the democratic transition in 1987, the main source of the government-opposition 
cleavage among the electorate was an individual’s view about democracy – whether 
democracy is an appropriate political system in the Korean context. After the 
democratic transition in 1987, this government-opposition division became 
unimportant. Instead, there are fairly stable political-social value orientations among 
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the candidates. Put another way, the orientational affinity between voters and 
candidates is a factor that the Korean voters take into account in their decision making 
process. This is due to the lack of distinctive policies and splits and merges of parties 
after democratic reform. This is closely related to the fact that Korean political parties 
are based on the charisma of individual leaders rather than on grassroots movements.  
 
3.3 Measurement of Political Sophistication and Other Independent Variables 
3.3.1 Literature Review on Measurement of Political Sophistication 
How can we measure political sophistication? Many citizens spend very little 
time attending to the details of politics. This makes us suspicious of what they have in 
mind when they vote. Since voting scholars cannot observe voters' thoughts directly, 
they often turn to surveys for proxy measures.  
Thus, scholars have measured political sophistication in various ways, 
sometimes relying on factual knowledge questions (Bennett 1994; Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1993; 1996; Junn 1991; Zaller 1990), past political participation, interviewer 
ratings of knowledge (Bartels 1996), political engagement, and content coding of 
open-ended responses (Luskin 1990), and additive scales of elements listed above 
(Chong, McClosky, and Zaller 1983; Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; McGraw, Lodge, 
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and Stroh 1990). 
Since the publication of The American Voter in 1960, many political scientists 
have made serious efforts to measure and monitor the political sophistication of the 
American electorate (Cassel 1984; Converse 1964; Hamill and Lodge 1986; Lau and 
Sears 1986; Luskin 1987; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976; 
Smith 1980; Zaller 1992). In their studies, political sophistication has been often 
equated with informed, structured, or ideological thinking. 
However, scholars largely criticize early investigations of the electorate’s 
political sophistication for concentrating almost entirely on the ideological component 
of an individual’s political understanding.32 These approaches have generally relied 
on the levels of conceptualization index (Converse 1964) and education to measure 
sophistication. Some research shows that when more direct indicators of political 
expertise are included in models alongside education, the effects of the latter on 
political behavior choice are sharply attenuated (Luskin 1990). Other work shows that 
the levels of the conceptualization index does not behave monotonically as would be 
                                            
32 There is a good deal of debate in the literature about what makes for a sophisticated voter. Some 
researchers have argued that simply having an ideology and being able to translate ideological 
sentiments into decisions is enough to be considered a political sophisticate (Knight 1985; Norrander 
1989). Others require that ideological judgments be coupled with issue judgments and economic 
assessments in order to reach the level of sophisticate (Kahn and Kenney 1997). Still others do not 
require ideology explicitly, and instead rely on things like knowledge of and interest in the political 
system and players (Abramson et al. 1992; Carmines and Stimson 1980; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Rahn, 
Aldrich, and Borgida 1994).  
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expected by theory. The point here is not that education and the levels of 
conceptualization index are invalid indicators of political sophistication, but that 
relative to political knowledge scales they are rather crude.  
Recent work suggests the superiority of a measure of political knowledge 
(Zaller 1992). The idea is that knowledge is not simply a cognitive construct but also 
a political resource that can benefit the individual and the polity. In this context, 
political knowledge is defined as “the range of factual knowledge about politics that is 
stored in long-term memory” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 10). For example, Fiske, 
Lau, and Smith (1990) look at how alternative measures of political sophistication 
such as media exposure, political interest, political activity, political self-schema, 
education, and political knowledge predict political information processing, and they 
find that political knowledge is most important.   
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) suggest measuring sophistication with a 
specific set of questions that encompass a broad range of topics. By asking 
respondents right-or-wrong questions regarding current politics and political figures, 
one achieves a better understanding of what political information has already gotten 
into a respondent’s mind. As sophistication is so fundamentally based on having 
knowledge of politics, this strategy has been widely adopted (Delli Carpini and Keeter 
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1996; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Jacoby 1995; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Martinez 
1990; Mutz 1993; Zaller 1992). 
Assessing trends in political sophistication represents a significant challenge 
because of measurement inconsistency over time. Unlike other survey items, which 
are often replicated without modification from one point in time to the next, political 
knowledge questions are normally updated to reflect changes in the political 
landscape. This is particularly true of the most common type of knowledge items that 
measure what Jennings (1996) has dubbed “surveillance” knowledge.  
There are two arguments for why these knowledge scales are valid measures 
of voter sophistication. First, there is a high likelihood that people with high 
institutional knowledge have a high degree of other political knowledge as well, 
which helps them to make an informed political choice more directly (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996). After all, with more information, there is reason to suppose that 
people’s opinions will change. Gilens (2001) focused on the effects of providing 
factual information to respondents. He shows that it makes a difference: when given 
correct information, many respondents changed their preferences. Clearly this is an 
important finding with potentially big implications. 
Second, questions assessing an individual’s level of political knowledge are 
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relatively immune to self-report biases, such as social desirability response sets or 
differences in “standards of self-description” (Fiske, Lau, and Smith 1990; Zaller 
1992). Also, this measure of political expertise requires no “judgment calls” from the 
researcher; each knowledge question has an objective and consensual answer (Fiske, 
Lau, and Smith 1990). 
Although the factual knowledge scale has become the customary measure of 
political sophistication, it is not undisputed. Mondak (2001) has been a leading critic 
of this measure. He argues that the usual format of these questions encourages people 
who are unsure but nonetheless know the correct response to answer “don’t know.” 
This leads to an invalid measure of sophistication. Because so many things can 
systematically affect a respondent’s willingness to answer a question, bias is 
introduced.33 Based on similar reasons, Bennett focuses on the group of voters that 
are undoubtedly ignorant. In two similar surveys he tries to assess the size of the 
group that he calls the “know nothings.” This group hardly manages to answer any 
question correctly (Bennett 1988; 1996).34 
                                            
33 Mondak (2001) suggests that the wording of these questions actually encourages “don’t know.” 
Questions are prefaced with “many people don’t know the answers to the following questions,” or 
worded by saying “do you happen to know...” In both of these instances, the wording of the questions 
suggests to the respondent that not only is it okay for them not to know the answer, but in fact a large 
number of others do not either. For respondents who are not confident in their political knowledge, this 
gives them an “easy out”; respondents who are not inclined to search their memories for an answer are 
also given a reprieve. 
34 Bennett argues that the choice of foreign politics does not affect the results significantly. People who 
totally lack information in one policy area most likely also lack information in other areas. 
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Second, Lupia (1994) emphasizes two alternative types of information. First, 
there is election-specific political knowledge, which in his case meant correctly 
identifying characteristics of California ballot propositions regarding insurance 
industry reforms. Second, there is knowing the preferences of certain groups or 
individuals, which provides an adequate substitute for the first type of knowledge, 
permitting badly informed voters to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed 
voters. 
Lupia (1994) examined how Los Angeles County residents voted on a series of 
insurance reform propositions in California’s 1988 General Election. He gathered exit 
poll data from L.A. County residents on Election Day to discover how they voted and 
how much information they were exposed to prior to the election. He analyzed the 
results of his poll and found that less informed voters used shortcuts to emulate the 
behavior of well-informed voters. Further, less-informed voters voted as if they were 
well-informed. Therefore, no information effects existed, as he found that there was 
no bias in his sample with respect to political knowledge, as the less-informed 
emulated the behavior of well-informed voters.35 
                                            
35 However, he only conducted an exit poll of Los Angeles County residents at only a few polling 
places. He generalized these results to apply to all American voters. This is problematic because Los 
Angeles County voters are significantly different from all other voters within California, much less the 
United States. Los Angeles is the second largest media market in America. Accordingly, those who live 
in Los Angeles County have a greater opportunity to be exposed to political ads than those who live in 
other parts of the United States. These residents may, therefore, be better informed. King, Keohane and 
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Finally, Lau and Redlawsk try to find out how many voters vote “incorrectly,” 
– that is, vote for a candidate whose opinions they do not share. They find that 25 
percent of the electorate vote directly against their own opinions (Lau and Redlawsk 
2001c). Lau and Redlawsk’s (2001b) experiments indicate that out of five types of 
sophistication, factual knowledge is the best predictor of the individual’s use of 
ideological schema in a mock presidential election. However they did not control for 
individuals’ understanding of ideological concepts. Instead, Luskin (1987) 
recommends using relative placements of candidates for office or parties on the 
ideological spectrum to measure political sophistication, because correct performance 
of these tasks requires both recognition and understanding of the ideological 
dimension.  
 
3.3.2 Operationalizing and Measuring Political Sophistication 
The primary independent variable in this study is political sophistication. As 
noted above, the standard approach for measuring political sophistication is the use of 
factual or knowledge-based questions. However, it is unfortunate that even the most 
up-to-date surveys of political attitudes and behavior in Korea rarely include more 
                                                                                                                             
Verba (1994) argue that researchers should select their cases such that they are typical cases within a 
given population. If researchers fail to do this, then any results they obtain will be biased. Lupia’s 
(1994) work is guilty of selection bias as he selected an atypical case that may have influenced his 
findings. 
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than two items that measure basic political sophistication. Thus, I do not use a direct 
measure of political sophistication in this work.  
Previous studies have documented that political interest is a major determinant 
of political sophistication.36 Political interest has a “huge effect” on political 
sophistication (Harvey and Harvey 1970; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Luskin 1990, 344; 
Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994), and in a European context it has been found that its 
influence is larger than that of education (Klingemann 1979). Television news 
viewing in the United States, Britain, and a number of other countries has been 
associated with higher levels of political sophistication and participation (Brehm and 
Rahn 1997; Norris 1996; 2000). The 1997 British election study, for example, 
revealed a positive association between attention to news and higher levels of political 
sophistication and civic engagement (Norris 1999). Interest in politics is expected to 
have a positive relationship with political sophistication, as a more interested person 
would be more likely to gather the necessary information. 
I assume that political knowledge and interest are essentially indicators of the 
same latent “political sophistication” construct. This perspective posits that 
                                            
36 Zaller (1992) proposes a non-monotonic relationship among political knowledge and opinion change 
in response to persuasive messages in the mass media. Well-informed citizens are more likely than 
poorly informed citizens to attend and to understand such messages, but at the same time, they are less 
likely to be influenced by them. As a consequence, moderately well-informed citizens will show the 
greatest levels of media-induced opinion change in comparison with both ill-informed and well-
informed citizens. 
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knowledge and interest can be regarded as synonymous. Indeed, several authors 
investigating the conceptual basis of political sophistication use these indicators 
interchangeably, or combine them into an additive scale (MacDonald, Rabinowitz, 
and Listhaug 1995). Thus, I have defined political sophistication as the conjunction of 
political interest and political knowledge in this dissertation.  
How then should political sophistication be measured? In an empirical 
analysis that attempts to asses the importance of voter’s political sophistication, it 
would be ideal to be able to measure people’s knowledge level as well as political 
interest. In other words, logic would suggest that separate indicators for the two 
components should be developed and combined into a single index.  
The line of reasoning is perhaps most readily apparent in the work of Neuman 
(1986), who develops a complex, composite measure using multiple indicators of 
salience, knowledge, and conceptualization. In contrast, some hold that carefully 
designed political knowledge scales can parsimoniously measure expertise (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1993; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Mondak and Anderson 2004; 
Zaller 1992). Measures lying between these two extremes are also used (Rahn et al. 
1990; Stimson 1975). Although the measurement strategy employed by Neuman is 
compelling, one could argue that separate measures of interest and conceptualization 
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are unnecessary, because sophistication can be validly measured with political 
knowledge scales.37  
Although there is a dispute over the relationship between these underlying 
traits and how they affect information processing, the important point to remember is 
that they are strongly and reciprocally related, and exert comparable effects on 
political behavior. For instance, someone who is very interested in politics will be 
motivated to seek out new political knowledge and assess its implications within the 
context of current beliefs and attitudes. Similarly, someone who knows a great deal 
about public affairs will take an avid interest in political news, actively seek out new 
political knowledge, and be able to efficiently process it, and so on. Consequently, to 
construct the measure of political sophistication, my variable is composed of seven 
variables measuring respondents’ knowledge and political interest. The questions used 
to build my index of political sophistication for the 2002 Korean presidential election 
are given in Table 3.
                                            
37 While this may result in models that are able to reliably predict variation in citizen sophistication, 
there is a clear danger that these estimates suffer a significant endogeneity bias. For, while political 
interest may indeed by fully exogenous to information holding, it is easy to construct a coherent 
narrative which suggests that increased knowledge of a subjective such as politics might also lead to a 
concomitant increase in interest in that subject. As Smith puts it: “Interest in politics presumably causes 
people to pay more attention to politics and thus to learn more about politics … but knowing a good 
deal about politics is likely to make people more interested in it” (Smith 1989, 192).  
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Table 3: Questionnaire Items for Political Sophistication 
Indicators of 
Political 
Sophistication 
Question 
Response Alternatives and 
Coding 
Political 
Knowledge 
Do you know how many years a 
presidential term is? 
1)wrong, 2)right 
 
Can you recall the name of the 
Governor of your province or city 
Mayor in which you live? 
1)wrong, 2)right 
 Compared to your neighbor, do 
you think your information and 
knowledge about this election is 
higher?  
1) not very highly – 7) very 
highly 
Political Interest Do you belong to any groups 
which support a political leader or 
candidate? 
1) no, 2) yes 
 What degree of attention did you 
pay to the televised debate 
between the candidates during the 
campaign? 
1) not at all, 2) very little, 
3) quite a bit, 4) a great 
deal 
 How interested were you in the 
election?  
 
1) not interested at all, 2) 
not so much interested, 3) 
somewhat interested, 4) 
very much interested 
 Do you generally follow political 
events and elections?  
1) not at all closely -- 7) 
very much closely  
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My measure of political knowledge relies on two measures of subjective 
factual knowledge and one self-reported measure of political knowledge. The two 
factual knowledge variables have two values: 1 and 2, indicating correct and wrong, 
respectively. The other variable is a 7-point subjective interviewee rating of his/her 
general level of knowledge about politics and public affairs. Despite the inherent 
subjectivity of the item, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993) and Zaller (1992) have 
presented evidence that it is a highly valid measure of political knowledge. 
Another indicator of political sophistication, political interest, is 
operationalized in this study by four survey questions concerning: (1) participation in 
political groups; (2) respondents’ use of the media to obtain voting information; (3) 
level of interest in the election; and (4) the tracking of political events. The first 
variable has two values -- 1 and 2. The second two questions have responses ranging 
from 1 to 4. The third political interest variable is a 7-point subjective rating of the 
respondent’s general level of tracking of political events. Table 4 provides the 
descriptive characteristics of all the variables for the index of political sophistication. 
Several diagnostic statistical tests were run to assess the scale. I ran both an 
internal consistency and a principal components analysis (PCA) using STATA. First, I  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Indicators of Political Sophistication (SOPH) 
Variable Name N Mean SD. Minimum Maximum
Presidential Term (Q1) 1500 1.919 0.272 1 2 
Governor Name (Q2) 1500 1.608 0.488 1 2 
Self-Reported Knowledge 
(PKNO) 
1500 3.977 1.459 1 7 
Political Activities (POACT) 1500 1.042 0.201 1 2 
TV Debate (TVDEB) 1500 2.871 0.733 1 4 
Election Interest (ELIN) 1500 3.263 0.759 1 4 
Political Interest (POIN) 1500 4.005 1.549 1 7 
      
Political Sophistication(SOPH)38 1500
-1.87e-
09 
1 -4.072 2.067 
 
used multi-trait analysis to test the hypothesized item groupings for the political 
sophistication (SOPH) scales by examining the internal consistency reliability of the 
items. Item internal consistency was used to test the assumption that the item is 
linearly related to the underlying concept being measured. Pearson correlations 
between items and scales (correcting for overlap) and between item means and 
standard deviations were calculated. Item internal consistency is considered 
satisfactory if the Pearson correlation between an item and its hypothesized scale is 
                                            
38 Note that the original observed variables are standardized before analysis so that their ranges and 
variations do not affect their index coefficients. The coefficients apply to the variables in their 
standardized form. First, I transformed the scores of these seven variables by using natural logs for a 
more normal distribution. Second, a standard or z score, like a percentile rank, is used to express the 
relative standing of a score with respect to the distribution to which it belongs. The mean of any 
standard score is always 0 and the standard deviation is always 1. The standard score for a particular 
raw score expresses its distance from the mean, expressed in units of standard deviation. It is calculated 
by subtracting the mean from each score and dividing by the standard deviation. 
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greater than 0.1. 
I hypothesize that the seven indicators described above are all positively 
associated with the underlying construct “political sophistication” and that the 
intercorrelations among them are due to this commonality. Table 5 presents the 
correlation matrix. All statistically significant correlations are positive, ranging from 
0.0010 to 0.6464. The strongest correlations are between POIN and PKNO (0.6464) 
and between POIN and ELIN (0.3971). POACT is significantly correlated with PKNO, 
but is not correlated with Q1 and Q2. These correlations are adequate for performing a 
factor analysis.  
Scale internal consistency was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α), 
which is based on the number of items in a scale and the item homogeneity. It has a 
correlation of 0-1 with higher values indicating a closer correlation, thus suggesting 
that the scale is assessing a single domain within the questionnaire. Coefficients 
above 0.7 and less than 0.9 are recommended (Carmines and Zeller 1979; McIver and 
Carmines 1981; Nunnally 1978; Streiner and Norman 2003). For my data, a simple 
scale of these seven items was constructed, and the reliability was estimated at alpha 
= 0.6327. This is slightly lower than the preferred level of .7.39 When the scale   
                                            
39 Using the STATA, I calculated reliability at scale level using the alpha “Cronbach’s alpha” option.  
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix for Indicators of Political Sophistication 
 
Presidential 
Term (Q1) 
Governor 
Name (Q2) 
Self-Reported 
Knowledge 
(PKNO) 
Political 
Activity 
(POACT) 
TV Debate 
(TVDEB) 
Election 
Interest 
(ELIN) 
Political 
Interest 
(POIN) 
Presidential Term 
(Q1) 
1       
Governor Name 
(Q2) 
0.2235*** 1      
Self-Reported 
Knowledge 
(PKNO) 
0.1636*** 0.1879*** 1     
Political Activity 
(POACT) 
0.0010 0.0320 0.0933*** 1    
TV Debate 
(TVDEB) 
0.1770*** 0.1614*** 0.3178*** 0.0468 1   
Election Interest 
(ELIN) 
0.1081*** 0.0894*** 0.3334*** 0.0692** 0.3125*** 1  
Political Interest 
(POIN) 
0.1562*** 0.1847*** 0.6464*** 0.1225*** 0.3240*** 0.3971*** 1 
Note: * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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reliability was tested using political knowledge only, the value of alpha was 0.4156. 
For political interest only the value of alpha was 0.5184. This shows that these 
questions “hang together” a little better for political knowledge than for political 
interest, which suggests that they comprise a better indicator of political sophistication 
than political knowledge. 
Next I employ principal factor analysis to combine the seven indicators into an 
index. This “data reduction” technique reduces a set of observed variables that are 
hypothesized to be related to one another to a smaller number of unobserved, more 
fundamental constructs called “factors” (Mardia, Bibby, and Kent 1979, 255; 
Nunnally 1978). It does so by detecting structure in the relationships among the 
observed variables as represented by their correlation matrix. All variables involved in 
the factor analysis need to be continuous and are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Since these factors are not directly observable, principal factors analysis is well suited 
to the area of political politics and psychology (Schonemann 1990; Steiger 1990; 
Velicer and Jackson 1990). In fact, psychologists originally developed the concept 
(Mardia, Bibby, and Kent 1979, 255).  
According to Putnam (1993), the most ‘reliable and valid’ means of combining 
multiple indicators into a single index is principal component analysis (PCA). This 
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technique produces a linear combination of correlated variables such that it 
maximizes the joint variance of its components. In a sense, it extracts from a matrix of 
indicators only a small number of variables that in some sense account for most of the 
variation in that matrix. The principal component analysis considers the variability in 
a variable that is common with other variables, factor analysis finds q common factors 
that reconstruct the p original variables. 
Yij = zi1b1j + zj2 b2j + … + ziq bqj + eij  
Where Yij is the value of the jth observation on the jth variable, zik is the jth 
observation on the kth common factor, bkj is the set of linear coefficients known as the 
factor loadings, and eij is similar to a residual but known as the jth variable’s unique 
factor. Principal factor analysis and varimax rotation methods were used to classify 
the seven variables into common groups. 
I therefore generate the first principal component of the seven types of 
political sophistication to identify which items were correlated with each other. For 
each identified factor, the analysis produces “loadings,” -- one for each variable -- 
which are estimated drawing only on the shared variance of the variables. Loadings 
represent the correlation between the observed variables and the factor. If, after 
examining the loadings, the hypothesis is borne out, then new variables (indexes, or 
 
 
 
97
“factor scores”) that are linear combinations of the observed variables are estimated 
based on the loadings.  
Table 6 contains the factor analysis output. Of the seven factors identified, 
only the first two capture sufficient variance to be retained.40 In the first analysis, no 
restriction was made on the number of factors to be extracted, only that those with 
eigenvalues over 1, a standard cut-off for when a component is considered usable 
(Kim and Mueller 1978). Two factors were extracted (using varimax rotation)41; the 
first with an eigenvalue of 2.3758 with 33.94 percent of variance explained, and a 
second with an eigenvalue of 1.0882 and 15.55 percent of the variance explained. A 
close look at the factors shows that they may be an artifact of the measurement scales, 
which differed by question. 
The loadings of all seven indicators are positive for the first factor. This is the 
factor that was chosen to represent the level of political sophistication. The second 
factor has a positive loading for Q1, Q2, PKNO, TVDEB, and POIN, but negative 
loadings for the other indicators. The first component’s highest loadings are for self- 
                                            
40 The factor analysis was conducted in STATA (version Intercooled/8.2) using the default “principal-
component factors” (pcf) option. Note that by default, STATA will retain all factors with positive 
eigenvalues. The factors(#) option does not specify the number of solution to retain, but rather the 
largest number of solutions to retain.  
41 Factor loadings are often rotated in an attempt to make them more interpretable. STATA performs 
both varimax and promax rotations. The purpose of rotation of factors is to get the variables to load 
either very high or very low on each factor. In the data, because all of the variables loaded onto neither 
factor 1 nor factor 2, the rotation aided in the interpretation. Thus, it made the results easier to interpret. 
 
 
 
98
 
Table 6: Results of Factor Analysis of Political Sophistication Indicators  
Factor Eigenvalue 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
2.3758 
1.0882 
0.9698 
0.8004 
0.7508 
0.6668 
0.3482 
 Indicators 
Factor Loadings of 
First Component 
Factor Loadings of 
Second Component 
Uniqueness 
Presidential Term 
(Q1) 
0.1123 0.7546 0.4179 
Governor Name 
(Q2) 
0.1487 0.7070 0.4781 
Self-Reported 
Knowledge 
(PKNO) 
0.7894 0.1367 0.3582 
Political 
Activities 
(POACT) 
0.3165 -0.2983 0.8108 
TV Debate 
(TVDEB) 
0.5580 0.2635 0.6192 
Election Interest 
(ELIN) 
0.6739 -0.0006 0.5459 
Political Interest 
(POIN) 
0.8268 0.1021 0.3060 
Note: Using Varimax Rotation and Principal Components Analysis 
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reported political knowledge and four questions dealing with political interest. The 
second component’s highest are for the two factual questions. The uniqueness 
reported represents the proportion of variance of each indicator that is shared with the 
others. On substantive grounds it is difficult to interpret these results.  
Because I am ultimately interested in political sophistication it is very 
cumbersome to have to deal with two different components of political sophistication 
and it would be nearly impossible to interpret two components interacted with 
sophistication. Thus, a second factor analysis was run, this time constraining the  
solution to only one factor. In this case, the solution showed that this primary factor 
explained 33.94% of the variance, with the eigenvalue of 2.376. This is exactly the 
same in the initial unconstrained solution.    
A principal component factor analysis of the seven items yielded a single 
factor with an eigenvalue greater than one and a strong Cronbach alpha (0.6327). This 
factor was labeled political sophistication, SOPH. Table 7 shows the scoring 
coefficient of each component; that is, its individual weights in the index.  
A factor score based on the regression method was derived for each group of 
items. The factor scores could be interpreted as a subscale of the scores of the grouped 
items. Hence, my measure of political sophistication is comprised of each individual’s 
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Table 7: Factor Analysis of Political Sophistication Items Constrained to Single 
Factor 
Indicator Factor Loading Scoring Coefficients 
Presidential Term (Q1) 0.3778 0.1590 
Governor Name (Q2) 0.3944 0.1660 
Self-Reported Knowledge 
(PKNO) 
0.7853 0.3306 
Political Activities 
(POACT) 
0.1871 0.0788 
TV Debate (TVDEB) 0.6155 0.2591 
Election Interest (ELIN) 0.6280 0.2643 
Political Interest (POIN) 0.8077 0.3400 
Note: Using Principal Components Analysis 
 
regression scores explaining this political sophistication factor. Thus, the political 
sophistication (SOPH) variable is calculated as follows: 
SOPH = 0.1590*Q1 + 0.1660*Q2 + 0.3306*PKNO + 0.0788*POACT + 
0.2591*TVDEB + 0.2643*ELIN + 0.3400*POIN, 
where the values of the indicators are standardized values. Accordingly, POIN is 
given the greatest weight, followed by PKNO, ELIN, TVDEB, Q2, Q1, and POACT. 
Factor scores are computed such that the mean is set at zero; values below the mean 
are negative and values above the mean are positive. Principal components analysis 
yields an index almost identical to the factor analysis index. The shape of its 
probability distribution is almost normal, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Values for Political Sophistication 
 
Finally, a number of demographic variables are included in my analyses. The 
literature suggests that a number of variables should be important in explaining 
political sophistication, political party identification, and voter turnout. My models 
control for the effects of seven demographic and social-psychological variables, all of 
which could be considered fundamental variables: age, gender, education, income, 
residential size, region, and ideology. 
Regarding the determinants of Korean voters’ choices, regionalism has been 
identified as the most significant (Lee 1993a; Morriss 1996; Park 1993a; b). In other 
words, voters are likely to cast their ballots for the party that is led by the leaders from 
the same home province as the voters. The regional dummy variables are included to 
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explore how much regional voting differs across levels of party identification and vote 
choice. There are two dummy variables, one each for birth in the Cholla and 
Kyungsang regions, leaving the other provinces as the omitted category. Regionalism 
is the serious factor between these two provinces as we reviewed in the above chapter. 
In each case, birth in the region is coded as a 1, and birth elsewhere a as a 0. Thus, 
CHOLLA represents Cholla province hometown. I coded 1 for these voters and 0 for 
the others. KYUNGS represents Kyungsang province hometown. I coded 1 for these 
voters and 0 for the others.42 The statistical models I will use to test my research 
questions contain each of these variables. More details on the explanatory variables 
are given in Tables 8 and 9. 
 
                                            
42 ‘Hometown’ rather than ‘region of residence’ was chosen to represent regionalism. For the purpose 
of explaining vote choice, it is critical to know where voters were born. Using Alford’s class voting 
index, Jaung’s (2000) measure of the regional voting index in Korea shows that political parties have 
very low representatives across regions. Studies show that the hometown matters more than the region 
of current residence in terms of mass political behavior. According to Lee (1997), a voter’s hometown 
explains voting behavior better than present place of residence. That is, voters who left their hometown 
are more likely to support the party of their hometown than the party of their current residence. Lee 
reaches this conclusion by comparing the explanatory power of two logit models, which respectively 
predict regional party support in terms of the voters’ hometown or place of residence. Lee finds that the 
variable for a voter’s hometown explains about 4 percent more of the variation in regional party 
support than the variable for a voter’s place of residence. In the survey, hometown is measured by the 
following closed-ended question: “where is your hometown?” 
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Table 8: Summary of Variables 
Variables Description43 
Dependent 
Variables: 
 
Party Identifier 
(PID) 
“Do you think of yourself as a supporter of any political party?” 
0 = no, 1 = yes 
Voter Turnout 
(VOTE) 
“Did you vote in the election?” 
0 = no, 1 = yes 
Candidate Choice 
(ROH) 
“(If voted) Who did you vote for in the election?” 
0 = voted for an opposition party candidate, 1 = voted for the 
governing party candidate 
Independent 
Variables: 
 
Political 
Sophistication 
(SOPH) 
Index composed of seven variables relating to political 
sophistication. See each questionnaire in Table 4.  
Scale = -4.0720 to 2.067.  
Age (OLDER) “How old are you?” 
1 = 20-29, 2 = 30-39, 3 = 40-49, 4 = 50 and over  
Gender (MALE) “What is your gender?” 
1 = female, 2 = male 
Educational 
Attainment 
(EDUCAT) 
“What is your education level?” 
1 = elementary school graduate and below, 2 = middle school 
graduate, 3 = high school graduate, 4 = college graduate and 
beyond 
Income (RICHER) “What is your average household monthly salary?”  
1 = earned 700,000 won ~ 8 = earned 4 million won44 
Residential Size 
(URBAN) 
“Where do you live?” 
1 = rural area, 2 = suburban area, 3 = urban area. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
43 The following questionnaires are translated from Korean. They are sometimes reworded and recoded. 
44 In 2002, the exchange rate was around 1,200 won per dollar and now reached to around 1,000 won 
per dollar. 
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Table 8: Continued. 
Variables Description 
Hometown 
(CHOLLA and 
KYUNGS) 
“Where were you born?” 
CHOLLA: 0 = birth elsewhere, 1 = birth in the Cholla region  
KYUNGS: 0 = birth elsewhere, 1 = birth in the Kyungsang 
region 
Ideology (PROG) “How do you describe your ideological orientation?” 
1 = conservative, 2 = moderate, 3 = progressive voters 
 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
Variable Name N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Party Identifier (PID) 1500 0.595 0.491 0 1 
Voter Turnout (VOTE) 1500 0.884 0.320 0 1 
Candidate Choice (ROH) 1314 0.564 0.496 0 1 
Political Sophistication 
(SOPH) 
1500 
-1.87e-
09 
1 -4.072 2.067 
Age (OLDER) 1500 2.555 1.138 1 4 
Gender (MALE) 1500 1.493 0.500 1 2 
Education (EDUCAT) 1492 3.082 0.959 1 4 
Income (RICHER) 1435 4.385 2.054 1 8 
Residential Size (URBAN) 1500 2.378 0.673 1 3 
Hometown (CHOLLA) 1494 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Hometown (KYUNS) 1494 0.334 0.472 0 1 
Ideology (PROG) 1500 2.144 0.811 1 3 
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3.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I explain my data measurement strategies. The main research 
question in this dissertation is: What is the relationship between political 
sophistication and the use of partisan cues? The data comes from a post-election 
survey of the 2002 Korean presidential election conducted by the Korean Social 
Science Data Center. It was conducted between 20 December and 27 December 2002. 
The data were gathered by telephone interviews with 1,500 random voters chosen 
through a stratified, multi-stage probability design. 
To test the relationship between political sophistication and the use of partisan 
cues, I created three dependent variables: party identification, voter turnout, and 
candidate choice. One of the important jobs in this dissertation is to create a political 
sophistication variable. Due to the short of items in my data, I have redefined political 
sophistication as the conjunction of political interest and political knowledge instead 
of a direct measure of political sophistication. My political sophistication variable is 
an index of seven variables measuring respondents’ knowledge and political interest.  
After running several diagnostic statistical tests such as reliability and factor 
analyses, I created the new variable, political sophistication. Because of the obvious 
 
 
 
106
interpretational advantages of single dimensions and the small number of items 
analyzed, I stick to the results of factor analysis with a single component. A principal 
component factor analysis of the seven items yielded a single factor with an 
eigenvalue greater than one and a strong Cronbach alpha (0.6327). This factor was 
labeled political sophistication, SOPH. In addition, I include seven demographic and 
social-psychological variables: age, gender, education, income, residential area, 
region and ideology. 
I will rely on a series of logit regression models predicting party identification, 
voter turnout, and candidate choice, because the dependent variable in all my models 
is dichotomous. All models include a range of socio-demographic variables which are 
mostly drawn from theories of political sophistication, party identification and 
political behavior in established democracies.    
  
 
 
 
107
 
Chapter IV. Analyses and Results 
 
This chapter focuses on the relationship between political sophistication and the use 
of partisan cues in Korea’s 2002 presidential election. According to the literature 
presented in Chapter Two, there should be a relationship between political 
sophistication and the use of partisan cues. I performed a regression analysis and a 
series of logit regression analyses to address my questions.  
 
4.1 Individual Characteristics and Political Sophistication 
A number of scholars have demonstrated that voters vary dramatically in their 
attention to politics, in their general understanding of political phenomena, in their 
ability to synthesize new political information, and in the cohesiveness and 
persistence of their political predispositions (Converse 1962; 1964; Converse and 
Markus 1979; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Luskin 1987; Sniderman, Glaser, and Griffin 
1990; Zaller 1992). Converse (1990, 372), reflecting on the differing levels of 
political sophistication in the electorate, notes, “the two simple truths I know about 
the distribution of political information in modern electorates are that the mean is low 
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and the variance is high.”  
Delli Carpini and Keeter argue that it is necessary to look at those who know a 
lot about politics to see if they are systematically different from the rest of the 
population. They find that Americans who know more about politics are different 
from everyone else. Those who have a higher sense of political efficacy, discuss 
politics regularly, make more money, read the newspaper, are male, have a strong 
sense of civic duty, are strong partisans, are nonsoutherners, are white, are more 
educated and are older, are more likely to know about politics (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996). Moreover, they discover that societal factors affect a person’ s political 
knowledge as these factors underlie individual factors (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). 
They provide evidence that information effects exist, as those with certain 
characteristics are more likely to know about politics than those without those 
characteristics. 
Thus, I begin by examining the relationship between individual characteristics 
and political sophistication. Table 10 shows the results of an ANOVA analysis that 
compares the political sophistication (SOPH) scores of different groups. The results 
show that there are significant differences in levels of sophistication across age, 
gender, education, and ideology groups. There are also differences across income  
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Table 10: ANOVA Results for Differences in Political Sophistication (SOPH) 
Scores 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Freq. F-ratio P 
Age (OLDER)      
20s -0.154 0.984 357 
30s 0.026 0.879 382 
40s 0.205 0.914 333 
50s and over -0.055 1.143 428 
8.11 0.000
      
Gender (MALE)      
Female -0.235 1.019 761 
Male 0.242 0.919 739 
90.73 0.000
      
Education (EDUCAT)      
Elementary School Graduate and 
Below 
-0.579 1.276 150 
Middle School Graduate  -0.193 1.106 180 
High School Graduate 0.052 0.905 560 
College Graduate and Beyond 0.151 0.911 602 
25.29 0.000
      
Income (RICHER)      
Earned 700,000 won -0.100 1.152 157 
Earned 900,000 won -0.233 1.037 129 
Earned 1.2 million won -0.055 1.006 201 
Earned 1.5 million won -0.070 1.003 271 
Earned 2 million won 0.143 0.843 269 
Earned 2.5 million won 0.055 0.883 130 
Earned 3 million won 0.136 0.993 158 
Earned 4 million won 0.124 1.014 120 
3.11 0.003
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Table 10: Continued. 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Freq. F-ratio P 
Residential Size (URBUN)      
Rural Area -0.210 1.147 163 
Suburban Area 0.025 1.000 607 
Urban Area 0.026 0.960 730 
4.03 0.018
      
Ideology (PROG)      
Conservative  -0.113 1.068 400 
Moderate -0.274 1.055 484 
Progressive 0.289 0.820 616 
49.33 0.000
 
groups and residential groups.  
The mean is low, and the variance is high. That is, there is an important 
amount of variance in the level of political sophistication among citizens, and this 
variance is unevenly distributed, since the highest degree of political sophistication 
tends to be concentrated among those who are politically and socially advantaged. 
From the standpoint of democratic theory, this highly unequal distribution of political 
sophistication may be as troubling as low levels of political sophistication. Because 
people with fewer resources – such as income and education – tend to be less 
informed about politics, they are likely to be less politically engaged and effectual. 
These points will be revisited later in the chapter. 
Next, the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model shown in Table 11 
uses political sophistication as the dependent variable. The Table reports  
 
 
 
111
  
Table 11: OLS Results: The Determinants of Political Sophistication 
Independent Variables b Std. error t-ratio p-value Beta
Age (OLDER) 0.203*** 0.026 7.83 0.000 0.231
Gender (MALE) 0.393*** 0.050 7.93 0.000 0.198
Education (EDUCAT) 0.256*** 0.034 7.63 0.000 0.242
Income (RICHER) 0.017 0.013 1.28 0.200 0.035
Residential Size (RURAL) 0.027 0.037 0.73 0.466 0.018
Ideology (PROG) 0.214*** 0.031 6.90 0.000 0.175
Constant -2.495*** 0.182 -13.73 0.000  
      
Number of Observations 
F-ratio 
R2 (Adjusted R2) 
1428 
40.55*** 
0.146 (0.143) 
Note: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed).  
 
 
unstandardized coefficients (b), and standardized coefficients (Beta) for the 
independent variables to assess the relative strength of each variable in affecting the 
level of political sophistication.  
The results show that the effects of four variables are positive and statistically 
significant. Respondents who are older, male, highly educated, and progressive are 
more politically sophisticated than their opposites. The relationships between 
sophistication and age (OLDER), gender (MALE), education (EDUCAT), and 
ideology (PROG) are all significant and positive. This model provides considerable 
support for Delli Carpini and Keeter’s work and a number of the traditional 
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relationships between the levels of political sophistication and the explanatory 
variables. Specifically, a one standard-deviation increase for older people, males, 
those with more education, and progressives produces an increase in sophistication of 
23%, 20%, 24% and 18%, respectively. In this model, education (EDUCAT) has the 
largest standardized coefficient, 0.24 (in absolute value), and ideology (PROG) has 
the smallest, 0.18. 
Thus, a one standard deviation increase in level of education leads to a 0.24 
standard deviation increase in predicted political sophistication (SOPH), with the 
other variables held constant at their means. And a one standard deviation increase in 
ideology leads to a 0.18 standard deviation increase in predicted SOPH (with other 
variables held constant). The estimated regression coefficients for these variables are 
significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed test). 
 
4.2 The Impact of Political Sophistication on Party Identification 
Next, I examine the main research question. That is, I explore how individual 
characteristics and political sophistication influence political party identification. 
Partisans seem to engage their civic responsibilities more competently and more 
enthusiastically than nonpartisans, or “independents,” whether measured by an 
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individual’s information, sophistication or participation levels (Green, Palmquist, and 
Schickler 2002). The success of party identification in explaining American political 
behavior has inspired continued research on the topic. 
In Korean politics, important demographic determinants of party identification 
include region of origin, age, income, education, occupation, and gender (Horowitz 
and Kim 2002; Kil and Moon 2001; Mo and Moon 1999; Oh 1999). Although I do not 
expect to observe fully-developed party identification at such an early stage of 
democratic transition, I can distinguish between Koreans who exhibit initial 
tendencies toward partisanship and those who do not. In doing so, we not only begin 
to study how party identification emerges in new democracies, but also have an 
opportunity to shed light on debates about the cause of partisanship more broadly. 
This suggests at least a partial resolution to debates about the relationship between 
sophistication and party identification. Other factors matter as well.   
The results reported in Table 12 summarize the determinants of party 
identification as measured by whether or not a respondent sympathizes with a political 
party. Given the intense focus in the Korean party literature on the lack of popular 
support for political parties, the most important result is that political sophistication 
(SOPH) explains much of the variation in party identification. Among other 
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Table 12: Logit Results: The Determinants of Party Identification 
Independent Variables B Std. error z-ratio p-value 
Age (OLDER) 0.012 0.060  0.20 0.844 
Gender (MALE) 0.024 0.116  0.21 0.835 
Education (EDUCAT) -0.122 0.079  -1.54 0.124 
Income (RICHER) 0.020 0.030  0.68 0.498 
Residential Size (URBAN) -0.085 0.086  -0.99 0.324 
From Cholla (CHOLLA) 0.741*** 0.166 4.46 0.000 
From Kyungsang (KYUNGS) -0.017 0.123  -0.13 0.893 
Ideology (PROG) -0.177* 0.073  -2.41 0.016 
Political Sophistication (SOPH) 0.434*** 0.063 6.92 0.000 
Constant 1.068 0.453  2.36 0.018 
    
Number of Observations 
Log Likelihood 
LR chi2 (9) 
Pseudo R2 
Prob. > chi2 
ROC: Area Under Curve45 
1423 
-920.78 
84.47*** 
0.044 
0.000 
0.6388 
Note: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed).  
                                            
45 The final diagnostic may be applied to evaluate the quality of the models. Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curves show that the models using survey data have moderate predictive power. 
The ROC curve is a graph of sensitivity compared to 1-specificity (Swets 1996). Sensitivity reflects 
observed positive outcome cases that a model correctly classifies, while specificity reflects negative 
outcome cases that the model correctly classifies. The 45-degree line in the graph shows no predictive 
power of a model that is 0.5 as the predictive power increases, the area under the curve also increases. 
The area beneath the curve is almost 64 percent, indicating the model’s moderate performance. In other 
words, the logit regression equation of Table 11 correctly predicted responses for 63.88% of the 1,500 
respondents included in the analyses. 
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demographic and social-psychological variables, Cholla natives (CHOLLA) and 
ideology (PROG) explain the most. Specifically, a one standard-deviation increase in 
CHOLLA and PROG produces an increase in PID of 210% and a decrease of 84%, 
respectively. 
My analysis most strongly supports the view that sophistication accelerates the 
development of partisanship (See Figure 3). The effects are substantial. A one 
standard-deviation increase in SOPH produces an increase in PID of 154%. This 
finding should not come as a surprise, as Gomez and Wilson (2001) and Delli Carpini 
and Keeter (1996) have demonstrated that political sophistication is a strong predictor 
of ideological and partisan thinking.46 
I believe that there are two reasons that sophisticated voters tend to identify 
with a political party. First, in a new democracy such as Korea, citizens face relatively 
high information costs. In making a choice, voters must navigate new political  
                                            
46 In STATA, in the case of “political sophistication” (SOPH), there is a direct relationship between the 
coefficients produced by logit and the odds ratios produced by logistic. A logit is defined as the log 
base e (log) of the odds,  
logit (p) = log (odds) = log (p/q) 
Logistic regression is in reality ordinary regression using the logit as the response variable,  
logit (p) = a + bX or log (p/q) = a + bX 
This means that the coefficients in logistic regression are in terms of the log odds, that is, the 
coefficient 0.43186 implies that a one unit change in SOPH results in a 0.43186 unit change in the log 
of the odds. The equation above can be expressed in odds by getting rid of the log. This is done by 
taking e to the power for both sides of the equation. 
p/q = ea + bX 
The end result of all the mathematical manipulations is that the odds ratio can be computed by raising e 
to the power of the logistic coefficient (exponentiated coefficients), 
eb = e0.43186 = 1.5401 
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Figure 3: Effects of Political Sophistication on Level of Party Identification  
 
procedures without the benefit of repeated experience in casting a vote that matters. 
Current Korean voters need much different perspectives and voting systems than 
those who lived under military or authoritarian regimes. Given the large gap between 
information demands and political experience for most of the electorate, politically 
sophisticated Koreans tend to acquire partisanship.      
Second, in terms of reliability, I refer to whether the voter perceives the party 
as providing useful information. For example, at the aggregate level, if members 
within a party take inconsistent positions, knowing the party’s position on that issue 
will not be extremely useful (Ray 2003). Furthermore, if the party takes ambiguous 
stands in the center of the political spectrum, the value of the cue will also be less 
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reliable in terms of providing information to citizens (Downs 1957). If an individual is 
familiar with a party and perceives that party as providing reliable information, then 
the party identification serves as a useful heuristic device, even if an individual does 
not identify with the party (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). For example, it was the 
norm in Canada until the 1990s for the major parties to avoid taking strong 
ideological stances; such parties may be unable to provide strong cues for citizens to 
follow. 
Another interesting result in Table 12 is that region of origin has an extremely 
important impact on party identification. Although Cholla voters (CHOLLA) are more 
likely to support a political party, Kyungsang voters (KYUNGS) are less likely to do 
so. This implies that Cholla voters’ support of their regional party is stronger than 
Kyungsang voters’ support. The southeastern Kyungsang region has traditionally been 
more supportive of the Grand National Party (GNP) and its predecessors. The 
southwestern Cholla region has strongly supported Kim Dae-jung and his party 
vehicles, including MDP. The Kyungsang-Cholla rivalry is a staple of Korean politics. 
Even after people migrate to other regions (particularly the Seoul region), early 
socialization along with family and personal ties are likely to preserve such regional 
identities. Membership in ethnic, linguistic, regional and other social groups that have 
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clear linkages to specific parties also encourages party identification (Campbell et al. 
1960).  
Meanwhile, the direct effects of individual levels of age, education, income 
are surprisingly weak predictors of the probability a Korean will self-identify as a 
partisan. Especially, age is not very important in the development of party 
identification in Korea. Dalton (2006) finds a positive relationship between age and 
partisanship in Britain and France, and Jennings (1979) demonstrates that early life 
experiences shape party attachments in Britain and Germany. In established 
democracies, a life-cycle perspective on age figures prominently in account for how 
partisanship develops and strengthens (Converse 1969; Jennings and Niemi 1981). 
Although a life-cycle approach seems ill-suited to the study of partisanship in Korea, 
a perspective that views age in terms of generational differences is appropriate.  
This means that age in itself is not important, but it can be a proxy for the length of 
time people have experience with a particular party or the length of time people have 
been able to confirm their identification with a particular party. This runs contrary to 
Converse’s argument (1969; 1976). As shown in Table 13, the results of the analysis 
that older voters were significantly more likely than younger voters to have a 
partisanship (χ2 = 7.1858, p < 0.1). 
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Table 13: Party Identification by Age  
Party Identification 
 
Nonpartisan Partisan 
Total 
20s 164 (45.94) 193 (54.06) 357 (100) 
30s 158 (41.36) 224 (58.64) 382 (100) 
40s 125 (37.54) 208 (62.46) 333 (100) 
Age Groups 
50s and Over 161 (37.62) 267 (62.38) 428 (100) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent row percent. χ2 = 7.1858; p < 0.1. 
 
 
4.3 Party Mobilization and Cognitive Mobilization 
The relationship between party identification and political sophistication 
implies that these two dimensions of how voters make decisions can be used 
dependently. This means that political sophistication contributes to party 
identification; political sophistication had a positively significant relationship with 
party identification. To explore these two different dimensions I will use a concept 
introduced by Dalton (1984).  
Dalton points to two different mobilization forces in the politics of advanced 
industrial nations: partisan mobilization and cognitive mobilization. These are not 
mutually exclusive -- there are voters who draw on both or neither -- but Dalton 
argues that they can be distinct. Those with high cognitive mobilization “posses both 
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the skills and mobilization to grapple with politics on their own” and, because they 
are more attentive, they rely on information rather than predispositions to make 
political decisions (Dalton 1984, 267).  
According to Dalton, the dramatic spread of education in advanced industrial 
democracies has produced a qualitative change in the political sophistication of 
citizens. At the same time, these societies have experienced an information explosion 
through the mass media. Both developments have led to a substantial decrease in 
information costs. Because of this cognitive mobilization, more voters now are able to 
deal with the complexities of politics and make their own political decisions. Thus, 
the functional need for partisan cues to guide voting behavior is declining for a 
growing number of citizens (Dalton 1984). At its core, Dalton’s theory discusses how 
the dynamics of dealignment have led to a new landscape for voters in advanced 
industrial nations. He says:  
 
Although many voters continue to rely on the decisional cues emanating from 
partisan ties, the need for such cues declines as the political skills of the voters 
increase and information costs decrease … Because of this cognitive 
mobilization, more voters now are able to deal with the complexities of 
politics and make their own political decisions. Thus, the functional need for 
partisan cues to guide voting behavior, evaluate political issues, and mobilize 
political involvement is declining for a growing sector of society (Dalton 1984, 
265). 
 
 
 
121
 
Dalton’s study was designed to identify electoral changes in advanced 
industrial societies and to explain decline in partisanship as a source of voter 
mobilization that is replaced by cognitive mobilization. However, because he makes a 
distinction between a cognitive dimension and a partisanship dimension, Dalton’s 
typology is a very useful concept for this analysis. Dalton distinguished between 
different types of voters, drawing on the following scheme in Table 14.  
According to Dalton there are four groups of voters: (1) apartisans, who are 
only cognitively mobilized (sophisticated independents); (2) cognitive partisans, who 
have both strong party attachment and high levels of cognitive mobilization 
(sophisticated partisans); (3) ritual partisans, who are strongly attached to a party but 
are not cognitively mobilized (unsophisticated partisans); and (4) apoliticals, who 
have neither a strong party identification nor a high level of cognitive mobilization 
(unsophisticated independents).  
 
Table 14: Dalton's Political Mobilization Typology 
Strength of Partisan 
 
Weak Strong 
High Apartisan  Cognitive Partisan 
Cognitive Mobilization 
Low Apolitical  Ritual Partisan  
Source: Russell Dalton (1984, 270). 
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Dalton’s typology explains how three groups of voters make decisions. The 
ritual partisans use the partisanship cue to make a vote choice. The cognitive partisans 
use both partisan cues and information. The apartisans have no party attachment but 
do not need them because they are cognitively mobilized. However, this leaves a 
fourth group of voters. How they make political decisions is unclear. This group is not 
small. This group is the largest group of all in many of the countries Dalton has 
studied. For example in Australia this group consists of 43.2% of voters, In the US, 
the figure is 11.8% (Dalton 1984, 272).47  
I will repeat Dalton’s initial analysis, again using the data from the Korean 
election study. I use political sophistication as an indicator of cognitive mobilization, 
while Dalton uses political interest, political knowledge, and education. Political 
sophistication seems to be a better indicator of cognitive mobilization than education, 
political interest, and political knowledge. Although a high level of political interest 
does influence cognitive mobilization, we are not yet sure whether a higher level of 
voter education means that cognitive mobilization is high.48 Therefore, using this 
                                            
47 Inglehart (1990) finds sharp generational differences in the patterns of partisan and cognitive 
mobilization for Europeans, which suggest the distribution of mobilization types will continue to shift 
as a consequence of generational change. 
48 Education can also be used to measure sophistication because it covaries with more direct indicators 
of the construct (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a). While this is certainly true at the empirical 
level, it makes more sense to develop indicators that directly tap sophistication. One can easily imagine 
two college graduates, one who takes little or no interest in politics and is marginally familiar with 
public officials and policy disputes, and another who follows political news in the Wall Street Journal 
and on the Sunday morning talk shows and knows a great deal about public affairs. An education proxy 
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information will produce more reliable comparisons.  
To construct the typology, I group people using attachment to any party in one 
group, and people indicating nonpartisanship in another group, exactly as Dalton 
(1984) did. For cognitive mobilization, I divide people at the 50th percentile on the 
political sophistication index (SOPH).49 Table 15 shows the four groups of voters. 
 
Table 15: Voter Types in Korea 
Strength of Partisanship 
 
Nonpartisan Partisan 
Total
High 
Apartisan (Sophisticated 
Independent) 
254 (34/42/16.9%) 
Cognitive Partisan 
(Sophisticated Partisan) 
496 (66/56/33.1%) 
750
Cognitive 
mobilization 
Low 
Apolitical 
(Unsophisticated 
Independent) 
354 (47/58/23.6%) 
Ritual Partisan 
(Unsophisticated 
Partisan) 
396 (53/44/26.4%) 
750
Total 608 892 1500
Notes: Numbers in parentheses represent row/column/total percents. The high level of 
political sophistication is significantly more prone to having a party identification 
than the low level of political sophistication (χ² (1) = 27.6581; p < 0.001)   
 
                                                                                                                             
would erroneously treat these two the same. Not surprisingly, some research shows that when more 
direct indicators of sophistication are included in multivariate models, the effects of education on 
political decision making are sharply attenuated (Bobo and Licari 1989). One study has even claimed 
that education and political expertise are unrelated to one another (Luskin 1990). 
49 Political sophistication is a continuous variable. Realistically, it is not simply a matter of being 
sophisticated or not; there are degrees of sophistication. However, one of the main purposes of the 
analysis is to compare groups of people (sophisticated versus unsophisticated voter), and this 
comparison is most cleanly done when there is a clear definition of who falls into which group. Thus, 
the dichotomized version of political sophistication is generally used here. Determining the cut-off for 
who is coded as sophisticated and who is not is somewhat arbitrary. The dichotomized measure is split 
so that 0-50 percentage scores are coded as zero, and 50-100 percent are coded as one. 
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Table 15 shows that politically sophisticated voters are more likely to have a 
party identification than unsophisticated ones. Cognitive partisans – those with party 
identifications and high cognitive mobilization – are the modal type (33%). These are 
the voters who depend on both partisan heuristics and information to manage the 
complex world of politics. Among independents, a much larger proportion of the  
public is apoliticals (24%) who lack party cues or cognitive skills to deal with politics, 
and the proportion of apartisans is relatively small (17%).   
The distribution of mobilization types in the Korean electorate is almost the 
same as that period during 1992-1998 as described by Dalton (1984; 2004) in his 
study of the American electorate, as seen in Table 16. In the case of the American 
electorate, growing sophistication has expanded the pool of Cognitive Partisans and 
Apartisans. And the proportion of voters who approach each election based on ritual 
dependence on party cues has decreased most dramatically. The mobilization patterns 
of the electorate have been transformed. Based on this analysis, the contemporary 
Korean electorate is less partisan, but also more likely to possess the cognitive skills 
and resources independently to manage the complexities of politics. The relatively 
large size of the “independent” population in Korea means that there is weaker party 
allegiance in Korea than in other countries, especially most Western countries. The  
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Table 16: The Distribution of Mobilization Types in America over Time, 1964-
2000 
Mobilization 
Type 
1964-
1966 
1968-
1978 
1980-
1990 
1992-
1998 
2000 Change
Ritual Partisan 47.1 37.4 35.6 29.9 26.8 -20% 
Cognitive 
Partisan 
27.1 26.2 29.1 34.1 32.8 +6% 
Apartisan 10.0 16.3 14.2 16.5 20.1 +10% 
Apolitical 16.0 20.1 21.1 19.6 19.8 +4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  
Source: Dalton (2004, 6). 
 
Korean electorate is more unpredictable and influenced by short-term effects than 
many Western societies.      
 
4.4 The Effects of Political Sophistication and Partisanship on Voter Turnout   
Korean politics, unexceptionally, reflects the worldwide trend of declining 
voter turnout, which is more frequently observed in advanced industrial societies. As 
illustrated in Table 2, the number of voters who participate in presidential and 
parliamentary elections has gradually decreased over the years. Official voter turnout 
rates in presidential elections have gradually decreased compared to those in past 
elections. For instance, the first direct presidential election in 1987 marked a record 
high turnout of 89.2 percent. Since then, voter turnout rates in the presidential election 
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dropped to 81.9% (1992), 80.7% (1997), and then to 70.8% (2002). 
Turnout was high when social constraints and party loyalties were at high 
levels but have since became more variable and dependent on the specific 
circumstances of an election (Dalton 1984; Dalton, Beck, and Flanagan 1984; 
Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992). In this sense, political sophistication has further 
implications for the choice of whether citizens cast a vote or abstain. Politically 
informed respondents do not simply follow longstanding loyalties but reconsider costs 
and benefits of casting a ballot in each election again. Thus, understanding political 
sophistication is vital if we are to heighten participation and improve representation. 
The aim of the next model is to explore how political sophistication affects voter 
turnout at the individual level. The dependent variable (VOTE) is self-reported voter 
turnout (1 = respondent reported having voted, 0 = respondent reported having not 
voted) and calls for logit regression analysis.  
To begin with, the results in Table 17 demonstrate the solid influence of the 
classical political variables on voter turnout. Almost 75% of the observations are 
accurately predicted, the pseudo-R2 is 0.1274, and some regressors have statistically 
significant impact. The results indicate that three variables explain voter turnout at the 
individual level. First, highly sophisticated respondents are more likely to vote. 
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Table 17: Logit Results: The Determinants of Voter Turnout 
Independent Variables B Std. error z-ratio p-value 
Age (OLDER) 0.266** 0.097 2.73 0.006 
Gender (MALE) -0.023 0.181  -0.13 0.897 
Education (EDUCAT) -0.136 0.130  -1.05 0.294 
Income (RICHER) 0.007 0.047  0.15 0.883 
Residential Size (URBAN) -0.180 0.136  -1.32 0.186 
From Cholla (CHOLLA) 0.425 0.266  1.60 0.109 
From Kyungsang (KYUNGS) 0.363 0.194  1.86 0.062 
Ideology (PROG) -0.011 0.117  -0.09 0.926 
Party Identification (PID) 0.559** 0.176 3.17 0.002 
Political Sophistication (SOPH) 0.760*** 0.089 8.50 0.000 
Constant 1.987 0.735 2.70 0.007 
     
Number of Observations 
Log Likelihood 
LR Chi2 (10) 
Pseudo R2 
Prob. > R2 
ROC: Area Under Curve 
1423 
-457.75 
133.70*** 
0.1274 
0.000 
0.7498 
Note: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed). 
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Second, party supporters are more likely to vote than independent voters. 
Finally, older people are more likely to vote. Political sophistication (SOPH) 
significantly influenced the odds of voter turnout at the 0.001 level, and age (OLDER) 
and party identification (PID) are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. These three 
variables are positively connected to voter turnout.  
The results show that political sophistication (SOPH) is the most important 
independent variable, followed by party identification (PID), and age (OLDER). The 
odds that a sophisticated voter voted are about 2.14 times greater than the odds that an 
unsophisticated voter did. The odds that a party identifier voted are about 1.75 times 
greater than the odds that an independent did. The odds that the older vote (OLDER) 
are about 1.30 times greater than the odds that the young do. 
The estimates of this model for the 2002 presidential election suggest that 
none of the sociological factors except age reached statistical significance. The 
younger generation’s lower turnout is associated with generational differences in 
Korea.50 The older generation feels more responsibility for the society than the 
                                            
50 Jennings and Markus (1984) use a generational approach to examine party loyalty. “The circle is 
thus closed: the younger voters have stabilized at an overall weaker level of partisanship than that of 
their elders, leading to mass volatile electoral behavior, which, in turn, fails to provide the consistent 
reinforcement needed to intensify preexisting partisan leanings” (Jennings and Markus 1984, 1014; 
Sears and Valentino 1997, 47). In essence, the younger generation is becoming more disengaged from 
the political process than the older one. However, Miller and Shanks (1996) argue that those who 
become comfortable voting at a young age continue to do so throughout life, making voting a habitual 
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younger generation does, thus, the older generation votes more. Through the World 
Values Survey conducted in 1990-91, Abramson and Inglehart (1995) found that the 
South Korean society is on the path to post-materialism in a similar way to that 
experienced by the Western countries. Korea has experienced very rapid economic 
growth since the mid-1960s, with the result that “the youngest South Koreans show a 
clear preponderance of postmaterialist values, with the trend line rising so steeply that 
this youngest cohort actually converges with its American counterpart” (Abramson 
and Inglehart 1995, 133). The old cohorts of Koreans included in the survey, however, 
still showed predominantly materialist values leading to an overall low level of post-
materialism in Korea. 
These results raise new questions about the causal relationships between 
education and voter turnout. Education produces a puzzle. As Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980, 102) point out, “personal qualities that raise the probability of 
voting are the skills that make learning about politics easier and more gratifying and 
reduce the difficulties of voting.” Nonetheless, the increased level of educational 
attainment is not accompanied by an increase in voter turnout (Brody 1978, 296). 
Since education alone cannot explain electoral turnout, the “puzzle” may be solved by 
                                                                                                                             
practice; on the other hand, they write, those who do not vote as young people continue to avoid going 
to the polls. 
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relating the decline in electoral participation not to education but to other 
socioeconomic factors. As far as education is concerned, higher educational 
attainment is expected to produce a higher rate of voter turnout, other things being 
equal.  
In the 2002 presidential election, the older generation, sophisticated voters, 
and party identifiers were more likely to vote than their young, unsophisticated, and 
independent counterparts. Nevertheless, this must have had little to do with the 
traditional voter mobilization. During the Korean authoritarian era, mobilized voters 
were more likely to be older people, women, less educated people, and rural residents 
(Kim 1998). Rapid economic development in the 1960s and 1970s had many younger 
and educated male workers move from their homes to urban industrial areas. As a 
result, the ruling party won in rural areas where older people, females, and less 
educated people were more likely to live, while opposition parties won in urban areas 
where younger people, males, and the more educated people lived. Thus, traditional 
voter mobilization was challenged by the people and the new democratic governments 
as well.  
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4.5 The Effects of Political Sophistication and Partisanship on Electoral Choice 
Political sophistication has substantial effects on political behavior. 
Information about candidates’ party affiliations or party ties can shape opinion-
holding on candidates (Mondak 1993a), the direction of citizens’ preferences (Jacoby 
1988; Mondak 1993b; Squire and Smith 1988), and perceptions of candidates’ issue 
positions (Conover and Feldman 1989; Feldman and Conover 1983). Politically 
sophisticated individuals are better able to link their individual and group interests 
with their issue positions (Althaus 1998; Gidengil 2004) and vote choice (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Johnston 1996).  
In Table 18, age (OLDER), residential Area (URBAN), voters’ hometown 
(CHOLLA and KYUNGS), ideology (PROG), and party identification (PID) have 
statistically significant effects on voters’ support for candidates. Table 18 also 
indicates that none of the demographic variables except OLDER and URBAN have a 
significant effect on support for the MDP candidate. 
 Next, consider the substantive interpretation of effects of the variables that 
are statistically significant. First, the odds that party identifiers oppose Roh Moo-hyun 
(ROH) are about 0.53 times greater than odds that others do. The party identifier was 
less likely to vote for the incumbent party’s Roh Moo-hyun. In short, party 
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Table 18: Logit Results: The Determinants of Voter Choice 
Support For Roh Moo-hyun  
(Millennium Democratic Party) Independent Variables 
B Std. error z-ratio p-value 
Age (OLDER) -0.274*** 0.073 -3.76 0.000 
Gender (MALE) 0.020 0.139 0.15 0.883 
Education (EDUCAT) -0.058 0.093 -0.62 0.536 
Income (RICHER) -0.042 0.037 -1.15 0.252 
Residential Size (URBAN) -0.265* 0.106 -2.51 0.012 
From Cholla (CHOLLA) 2.509*** 0.284 8.84 0.000 
From Kyungsang (KYUNGS) -0.828*** 0.141 -5.87 0.000 
Ideology (PROG) 0.717*** 0.087 8.25 0.000 
Party Identification (PID)  -0.632*** 0.140 -4.53 0.000 
Political Sophistication (SOPH) 0.110 0.080 1.38 0.166 
Constant 0.743 0.544 1.37 0.172 
     
Number of Observations 
Log Likelihood 
LR Chi2 (10) 
Pseudo R2 
Prob. > chi2 
ROC: Area Under Curve 
1240 
-664.69 
373.33*** 
0.219 
0.000 
0.8041 
Note: * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed).   
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identification played a significant role in voter choice. 
Second, the effects of voters’ hometown (CHOLLA and KYUNGS) are 
surprising. Cholla natives (CHOLLA) are more likely to support the MDP candidate 
(ROH) than non-natives. The odds that Cholla natives support Roh are about 12 times 
greater than the odds that natives in other regions do so. In contrast, the odds that 
Kyungsang natives (KYUNGS) oppose Roh are about 0.44 times greater than the odds 
that natives in other regions do. These figures suggest not only that regionalism was 
one of the strongest factors in the 2002 election, but also that Cholla natives were 
more likely to be regional voters.   
Third, the odds that progressive voters voted for Roh are about 2 times greater 
than for moderate voters and about 4 times greater than for conservative voters.51 The 
average ideological position of Roh’ supporters was skewed in a progressive direction. 
Recently, Koreans have witnessed the significant growth of liberalism after the 
economic crisis in 1997 and under the Kim Dae-jung government. This survey 
research reveals that Korean society is currently weakly progressive on the 
                                            
51 Using another formula, a one-unit increase in PROG increases the log odds that a voter votes for 
Roh by 0.717. Equivalently, a one-unit increase in PROG (from a conservative to a moderate) 
multiplies the odds that a voter votes for ROH by e0.717 (or 2). A two-unit increase in PROG (from a 
conservative to a progressive) multiplies the odds that voters vote for Roh by (e0.717)2 (or 4). 
 
 
 
134
progressive-conservative continuum.52 Respondents in the sample are distributed 
among the ideological categories of liberalism (41.1%), conservatism (26.7%), and 
centrist (32.3%). Liberal respondents are much more prevalent than conservatives. 
Fourth, due to regional cleavages, the influence of other sociological factors is 
weak on electoral choice in Korea (Lee 1993b; Shin 1999a). However, Table 19 
indicates that the younger generation had moved into the mainstream and assumed a 
leading role in Korean politics through this election, although regional politics still 
played an important role. Table 19 shows the split between the old and the young in 
the presidential election of 2002. As we can see, voters in their 20s and 30s 
overwhelmingly supported Roh Moo-hyun. On the other hand, voters in their 50s and 
over voted the same for two candidates. Those in their 40s constitute some sort of 
boundary between the two contending generations. 
 
                                            
52 In a survey conducted after the election (January 4-13, 2003), it was ascertained that the self-
reported ideological inclination of the Korean people had shifted from a moderate position to more a 
clearly expressed conservative or progressive positions. A distinct trend is a substantial increase in the 
progressive category, accompanied by a decline of the moderate group, and a minor rise of 
conservatives (Joong-Ang Ilbo [Korean]. February 10, 2003). In terms of ideological inclination scores 
(range: most progressive 0, middle 5, and most conservative 10), the average has fallen from 5.2 in 
January 2002 to 4.97 in January 2003, slightly tilting toward the progressive end. This shift has been 
observed for all age groups except for those 50 and older, and the largest shift has been found among 
those in their 40s, from 5.4 to 4.88. Applying the same score, Roh scored 4.2 and Lee 6.4 in August 
2002, but this changed to 3.88 for Roh and 6.27 for Lee in January 2003, indicating that Roh’s score 
moved further towards the progressive pole. In August 2002, the distance in ideology scores for the two 
candidates was identical -- 1.1 points. In January 2003, the distance had widened for Lee to 1.30 from 
1.1, but it remained about the same for Roh (1.14). Lee must have been perceived as having become 
more conservative over time.  
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Table 19: Voter Choice by Age in the 2002 Presidential Election 
Age Groups Roh Moo-hyun Lee Hoi-chang Others Number 
20s 68.04 24.74 7.22 291 
30s 61.26 32.73 6.01 333 
40s 49.32 45.58 5.10 294 
50s and over 48.99 48.99 2.02 396 
Note: χ2 = 57.7760; p < 0.001. 
 
This analysis identified the generational cleavage in Korean voting behavior. 
This was the first national-level election in the history of Korea in which generational 
differences played a critical role in the election outcome -- the elderly primarily 
supported Lee Hoi-chang, while the young preferred Roh Moo-hyun. Even though in 
previous elections older voters tended to prefer conservative candidates and younger 
voters liked progressive candidates, the difference in age preferences was not so 
striking (Kang 2003, 54-57). 
According to Inglehart (1977; 1997), there has been a revolutionary change 
since World War II in which societies are becoming increasingly “post materialistic” – 
endorsing values relating to self-expression, the quality of life, and the need for 
belongs – and less “materialistic” – endorsing values relating to economic and 
security concerns. Inglehart argues that this value shift can be best explained by a 
“cohort effect” or an intergenerational pattern of change. According to Inglehart, 
younger cohorts are more likely to endorse postmaterialist values because they have 
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been growing up in a more affluent environment in which lower order needs or 
materialist concerns are taken care of and taken for granted.53  
In this regard, Table 20 shows a clear difference in ideological stances 
between age groups, indicating that young voters tend to be progressive while older 
voters, especially in their 50s and older, are conservative. The younger a voter is the 
more progressive stance he/she takes. It is noteworthy that voters in their 30s, not in 
their 20s, were most progressive in 2002. The results in Table 20 indicate that 
ideological connotations in Korea may be different from those in other democracies.  
 
Table 20: Ideological Self-placement by Age 
  Ideology 
  Conservative Moderate Progressive 
Total 
20s 61 (17.1) 120 (33.6) 176 (49.3) 357 (100)
30s 62 (16.2) 119 (31.2) 201 (52.6) 382 (100)
40s 111 (33.3) 97 (29.1) 125 (37.5) 333 (100)
Age Groups 
50s and over 166 (38.8) 148 (34.6) 114 (26.6) 428 (100)
Note: Number in parentheses represent row percent. χ2 = 100.1007; p < 0.001.   
 
                                            
53 Inglehart believes that the growth of post-materialist values and ideology will decrease in 
importance because of their link within the old cleavage structure, and their lack of a link with value 
changes. Thus, liberalism and post-materialism should not necessarily go hand in hand. Postmaterialists 
do not automatically adopt whatever happens to be the conventional left position. On many issues, they 
do gravitate toward the left. But the rise of postmaterialism has brought a new perspective into play, 
one that sometimes runs against established political orthodoxy; it is reshaping the meaning of left and 
right (Kang 2003, 292-300). However, this does not seem to be the case in Korea. Ideology has been a 
strong cleavage throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium. The ideological preferences of 
Korean post-materialists have not fluctuated throughout the last three presidential elections.  
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This appears to be the effect of the democratization experience.54 Going one step 
further, it was claimed that the power of generation has demonstrated the possibility 
of overcoming regionalism in Korean politics. It is suggested that this was possible 
because in this election, the attitude of the younger generation shifted from apathy and 
indifference to participation. 
Finally, the odds that urban residents do not vote for Roh are about 0.8 times 
greater than for rural residents. Among the demographic variables, residential size 
(URBAN) is especially relevant to the Korean case. While studies before the 1990s 
mostly focused on the difference between rural and urban voters, research conducted 
as early as 1972 found strong regional patterns that cut across the urban/rural divide 
(Kim and Koh 1972). One peculiar conclusion drawn from these studies is that after 
controlling for region, standard demographic and socio-economic factors do not 
explain one’s voting choice very well. 
However, Korea has undergone rapid economic growth over the last 50 years. 
Unlike rural areas, urban areas are mixed with many people from all over the country, 
                                            
54 Voters in their 30s have often been dubbed as the “386 generation.” The number 3 stands for the fact 
that they are now in their 30s. The number 8 indicates they went to colleges and universities in the 
1980s. The number 6 represents that they were born in the 1960s. In comparison with the older 
generation who experienced the Korean War and subsequent absolute poverty, the 386 generation was 
the first beneficiary of economic development. They were actively involved in the pro-democracy 
movement against a military-based authoritarian regime in the 1980s. A shared experience of such 
political protest against the anti-authoritarian regime made them a “cohort” with similar political values. 
They are generally reform-minded and have an affinity with progressive ideology. Various poll results 
also show that the 386 generation is ideologically more progressive than other age groups (Kang 2003, 
292-300).  
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resulting in weaker regional identities than in rural areas. There is also more mobility 
among people who live in urban areas, and they tend to be younger and more highly 
educated than their rural counterparts. Before the emergence of regionalist party 
politics with the 1987 presidential election, urban areas have tended to vote for 
opposition parties and rural areas for the incumbent party. This urban-rural distinction 
in terms of electoral support for certain parties has long been an established voting 
pattern in Korea (Cho 1998; Kim and Choe 1988; Kim and Kihl 1988). While urban 
residents tend to support opposition parties, they are not as likely to vote as rural 
residents.  
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter analyzed survey data on political sophistication in Korea to 
identify the causal relationships between political sophistication and the use of 
partisan cues. A set of logistic regressions demonstrated several findings. First, 
consistent with the arguments of the impact of political sophistication, it was proved 
that political sophistication contributes to party identification in Korea; political 
sophistication had a positively significant relationship with party identification. The 
most surprising finding is that the relationship between party identification and 
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political sophistication is positive. For example, a one standard deviation increase in 
political sophistication yields a 1.54 times increase in the probability that one would 
have a distinct party identification.  
Secondly, as Dalton’s (1984) cognitive mobilization typology illustrates, 
voters with a higher level of political sophistication indeed tend to use partisan cues 
more than unsophisticated voters do in Korea. The existence of sophisticated voters 
resulted in increasing the commitment to voting and more progressive Korean politics. 
It is obvious that citizens’ knowledge and interest in politics play an important role in 
the relationship between levels of political sophistication and the use of partisan cues. 
Third, with regard to voter turnout, the traditional mobilization factors were 
not as significant as in previous authoritarian elections. Age and political 
sophistication were the factors that had significant impacts on voter turnout. 
Regionalism was not significant in the voter turnout models.  
Finally, with regard to the effects of political sophistication and partisan 
identification, the resulting analysis demonstrated that only the party identification 
variable was positively related to candidate choices. At the same time, regional 
cleavages remained a significant factor for voter decisions in Korea. The shift of 
determinants of candidate choice from regionalism to other factors may be an 
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indication of the advancement of Korean democracy. Nonetheless, long-lasting 
regional conflicts between Cholla province and Kyungsang province still have a 
significant impact on vote decisions.  
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Chapter V. Conclusion 
 
Political scholars have long debated “political sophistication” and whether or 
not average citizens can effectively play their part in a democratic system; that is, 
whether inattentive, poorly informed citizens are capable of sound political judgment 
and choice. In recent years this discussion has been dominated by the notion of 
cognitive heuristics, and by the optimistic argument that average citizens can use 
simple cues to compensate for their limited knowledge base (Brady and Sniderman 
1985; Carmines and Kuklinski 1990; Downs 1957; Graber 2001; Lupia 1994; Lupia 
and McCubbins 1998; Mondak 1993a; b; Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Popkin 
1991; 1994; Rahn 1993; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991a; Zaller 1992). The idea 
that political sophisticates do not use partisan cues in their decision making processes 
is a long-standing one. 
In this dissertation, I analyzed how Korean citizens make their vote choices. I 
focused on the relationship between the level of political sophistication and the use of 
partisan cues in the 2002 Korean presidential election. Political sophistication is not 
homogeneously distributed across the population. The mean is low, and the variance 
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is high. This highly unequal distribution of political sophistication may be as 
troubling as low levels of political sophistication. And the most important finding here 
is that more sophisticated voters behave differently from less sophisticated ones. The 
more Koreans know about and follow politics, the more likely they are to sympathize 
with a political party. There is no doubt that political sophistication influences voting 
behavior.  
This finding supports Delli Carpini and Keeter’s argument (1996) that political 
sophistication matters and that the more knowledge citizens bring to bear on politics, 
the better they are in linking their political behavior with their political attitudes. 
However, while the direct effects of individual levels of age, education, and income 
are surprisingly weak predictors of the probability a Korean will self-identify as a 
partisan, this study finds considerable support for the claim that regional political 
cultures shape partisan attachments.   
Moreover, I found a positive relationship between the level of political 
sophistication and the use of partisan cues. The use of party labels as a heuristic 
device does indeed work only for sophisticated voters. This does not imply that 
political sophisticates in Korea engage in party-centric voting by using partisan cues. 
Whether a Korean voter is sophisticated or unsophisticated, it is unreasonable to 
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expect that he/she would be able to collect detailed information about each and every 
candidate and issue (Gant and Davis 1984). While the implications of this finding are 
ambiguous at this point, it appears that the use of party cues by voters may not 
preclude them from acting like sophisticated voters.  
Nonetheless, the main finding of the dissertation is that political sophistication 
conceptually seems to possess an explanatory power of its own. Political 
sophistication contributes to party identification in Korea. That is, political 
sophistication has a positively significant relationship with party identification. 
Moreover, the existence of sophisticated voters has resulted in an increasing 
commitment to voting, and more progressive Korean politics. However, the concept 
of political sophistication and its role in relation to other variables should be studied 
more closely. 
There is one important implication of my findings for improving the quality of 
Korean democracy. The literature argues that the deepening of democracy should 
reduce inequalities, especially in the political sphere. Minimal informational 
requirements for making electoral choices and participating in elections are not 
readily available to all voters. This brings us back to the issue of inequality. The 
political sophistication and informational shortcuts that exist in the mass public in 
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Korea are not evenly distributed. (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Luskin 2002). 
Conventional democratic studies (Barber 1984; Conway 2000; Pateman 1970; 
Powell 1982; Verba and Nie 1972) have argued that citizens in democratic countries 
are interested and participate in politics. Political sophistication and participation are 
valued as contributors to strong democracy.55 Thus, Robert Dahl argued that a 
democracy, “should guarantee all of the rights to participate in the decision of the 
association” which implies political participation though suffrage or other means of 
influence (Dahl 1998, 36). From the standpoint of democratic theory this highly 
unequal distribution of political knowledge may be as troubling as low levels of 
political knowledge. Because people with fewer resources -- such as income and 
education -- tend to be less informed about politics, they are likely to be less 
politically engaged and effectual. As a result, inequalities in political sophistication 
tend to reproduce or reinforce broader inequalities in political life (Brady, Verba, and 
Schlozman 1995; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, ch. 6; Eveland Jr and Scheufele 
2000; Schattschneider 1960; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
Unfortunately, reducing the “sophistication gap” may be as difficult as 
increasing average levels of political sophistication. Most people are not especially 
                                            
55 It must, however, be pointed out that a high level of participation is not necessarily good for 
democracy (Tingsten and Hammarling 1963, 225-6). Neither does a high participation level guarantee 
influence on policy; this is the case especially in totalitarian states where the leader wants his followers 
to attend meetings and similar activities in order to indoctrinate them (Lipset 1960, 183). 
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interested in politics, and acquiring information carries an opportunity cost. Moreover, 
neither political interest, time, nor the capacity to absorb new information is 
distributed equally in the population. As a result, those who have less inclination or 
ability to acquire more knowledge about politics are unlikely on their own to suddenly 
start obtaining more of it, and some citizens will remain consistently more informed 
than others. 
However, the acquisition of political information and knowledge is dependent 
on environmental, institutional, and historical characteristics as well as on individual 
traits. For instance, Lupica and McCubbins (1998) argue that for political parties to 
serve as a source of information for voters, parties must be linked with specific policy 
preferences or ideological positions and must have consolidated “brand” names 
(reputations) that are discernable by the electorate. In other words, the impact of 
partisanship is conditional upon the historical factors that condition party strength. In 
cross-national research, Gordon and Segura (1997) and Berggren (2001) show that the 
level of political sophistication within a country can depend on the nation’s party and 
electoral systems. They go on to explicitly claim that the role of informational 
shortcuts is conditioned by institutions (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; 2000b; Shugart, 
Valdini, and Suominen 2005).  
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Several authors have gone further and have actually mapped systematic biases 
in the distribution of information based on historical inequalities (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996; Mondak and Anderson 2004). In other words, inequalities in the 
distribution of economic resources transfer to and are reinforced by inequalities in the 
distribution of political information and voice. It must be clear that the systematic 
biases are attributable not to personal characteristics of members of the 
underprivileged group, but to constraints that have been structurally imposed upon 
these groups over time. Hence, inequalities in political information are likely to mirror 
inequalities that affect other resources.  
 
5.1 Caveats and Suggestions 
This dissertation is by no means the end of the story. I recognize that there are 
limitations to my study. Much more research needs to be done on the following the 
problems: First, I am aware that the sophistication measures used here have 
considerable limitations. Conceptualizing sophistication with proxy variables such as 
political interest and the number of correct answers to a particular set of name 
recognition surveys is far from ideal. Various levels of political sophistication need to 
be taken into account adequately to estimate the impact of sophistication on the vote.  
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This paper falls very short of defining a new measure of the sophisticated 
voter. Instead, it merely shows the possibility that the exclusion of the party cue 
option may not be necessary in defining the sophisticated voter. Thus, it is my belief 
that a properly defined model of political sophistication, including a reliable scale of 
sophistication, would provide a better test for the cognitive theory. Further study may 
be able to clarify the concept of the sophisticated partisan in a more testable way. The 
preliminary distinction made between the sophisticated voter and the unsophisticated 
voter is a crude one, and it leaves a large group of respondents in the middle. Thus, 
we continuously pursue the valuable and effective way to figure out political 
sophistication. 
Second, an important caveat of this dissertation is that just as individuals are 
expected to vary in levels of sophistication, there also could be systematic differences 
across parties. The Korean parties and party systems that I investigated in this 
dissertation are very different from those of Western countries. The level of 
competition, the age of the parties, their ideologies, and their interaction with the 
public and with each other all influence to what degree these elements contribute to 
the usefulness of party cues. The usefulness of party labels and the effect of party 
reputation factors do vary by party and country. As I have indicated, this finding is the 
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most pervasive and significant, as it points toward a strong future research agenda. It 
is clear that future research needs to probe deeper into cross-national (and cross-party) 
differences.  
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